Massa, J.
Jordan Jacobs was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun without a license, and appeals his conviction under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, contending the search was constitutionally impermissible. We agree, and reverse.
On August 31, 2015, there were multiple reports of shots fired by youths wearing red clothing, a known gang color, near an apartment complex and neighboring park in a “high crime” area of Indianapolis. In response, police focused additional attention on the area, and at around 2:00 PM two days later in the park, Officer Terry Smith “observed several juveniles who looked like they should be in school,” which included Jacobs, age 18. … Officers Smith and Jeremiah Casavan pulled up near Jacobs, Smith got out of his car and ordered him to stop. Jacobs did not comply, and continued to walk away, at which point Officer Casavan exited his vehicle and both officers ordered Jacobs to the ground. … Officer Casavan handcuffed Jacobs while he was on the ground but “told him he was not under arrest.” After Jacobs got off the ground, the outline of a handgun was clearly visible in his pocket, which Casavan removed.
Jacobs was charged with one count of Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun without a license, and at his bench trial objected to the testimony of Officers Smith and Casavan, and the admission of the handgun into evidence, on the grounds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, found Jacobs guilty as charged, and sentenced him to one year probation. A divided panel of our Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Jacobs’ behavior in evading police in a high crime area was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot, particularly since the officers reasonably believed “Jacobs was committing the status offense of truancy.” Jacobs v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1253, 1261 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). …
Admission of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and thus we review admissibility challenges for abuse of that discretion. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). When, however, admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo. …
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Here, Officer Smith reasonably believed Jacobs to be a truant, which is a status offense that would have permitted an investigatory stop—when Smith first observed Jacobs in the park, at 2:00 PM. But “several hours” later, when Smith actually approached, Jacobs’ status as a truant had expired since school had already let out for the day, and thus was not a proper justification for the stop. Moreover, although Jacobs turned and left the park when a patrol car went by, only to return after it left, that does not in and of itself “establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
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We concur with the Court of Appeals’ observation that Jacobs’ actions, taken as a whole, were “indeed suspicious.” Jacobs, 62 N.E.3d at 1261. This is bolstered by the fact that Jacobs was actually carrying an unlicensed handgun. Nevertheless, at the time police moved to detain Jacobs, police did not have a reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in or was about to engage in any criminal conduct: “[M]erely looking suspicious is not sufficient to overcome Fourth Amendment protections[.]” Stalling, 713 N.E.2d at 925 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, we find this stop violated Jacobs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
While Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment in its text, we utilize a different method of interpretation: “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005)… Accordingly, we consider the following three nonexclusive factors in conducting a reasonableness analysis of warrantless searches: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” …
… while these officers had sufficient cause to be suspicious of Jacobs in general, that suspicion was not sufficiently linked to any articulable criminal activity; the first Litchfield factor thus weighs against the State. Second, the State acknowledges that “the intrusion was not exactly minimal because the police instructed [Jacobs] to lie on the ground, handcuffed him, and then took him to the area where the rest of the group was located.” Finally, the State contends the needs of law enforcement were high based on the recent shootings in the area, the juvenile nature of the group, and their display of gang colors.
However, as detailed above, Jacobs was an adult, and there was nothing apparent to connect him to the earlier shootings; thus the articulated needs of law enforcement were low with respect to Jacobs individually. On balance, therefore, we find the State’s detention and search of Jacobs unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Jacobs’ conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun without a license, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, J., concur.
David, J., concurs in result.