Barnes, J.
Eugene Roach appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We remand.
Roach raises two issues, but we address one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly denied his Batson challenge.
Indiana State Police Trooper Thomas Bennett was involved in a traffic stop in Marion County when a woman alerted him to a nearby situation. Trooper Bennett saw Roach and a woman near a bicycle and saw Roach hit the woman. Trooper Bennett yelled, “[H]ey, stop, police!” Roach made eye contact with Trooper Bennett, got on his bicycle, and pedaled away. A bystander intervened and blocked Roach from leaving, and Trooper Bennett arrested Roach. The State charged Roach with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Class A misdemeanor battery, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State later dismissed the criminal confinement and battery charges.
During voir dire of Roach’s jury trial on the resisting law enforcement charge, the State asked, “What are some duties of law enforcement officers that you can think of? Mr. James, what are some duties of law enforcement officers that you can think of?” After discussing the matter with a couple of prospective jurors, the State asked, “Mr. Wilson, you got anything to add to that?” Prospective Juror Wilson (“Juror Wilson”) responded, “Do the right thing.” Defense counsel also gave a hypothetical about the victim of an assault walking away from a police officer. She then asked, “How about you, Mr. Wilson? How do you feel about it?” Juror Wilson responded, “I INAUDIBLE press charges.” These were the only verbal interactions with Juror Wilson evident on the record.
The State apparently used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror Wilson. … Defense co-counsel then noted … “that Mr. Kevin Wilson, who is juror number fourteen is the only black male in the Jury pool. Our client is a black male.” Defense co-counsel argued that Juror Wilson’s answers during voir dire were not different than two white males—Mr. Bercot and Mr. Coble—that were also questioned.
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… The trial court then found: “Having listened to the arguments of both side[s], I don’t see that the State struck him with a purposeful act of discrimination. So, I’m going to deny your challenge.”
The jury found Roach guilty as charged of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court sentenced Roach to 365 days with credit of forty two days with the remainder suspended to non-reporting probation. Roach now appeals.
Roach argues that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson objection to the striking of Juror Wilson. It is well-settled that using a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. 2008) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)), cert. denied. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court provided a three-step process for determining when a strike is discriminatory:
“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”
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In the first step, “the burden is low, requiring that the defendant only show circumstances raising an inference that discrimination occurred.” Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012) (citing Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2417 (2005)). “This is commonly referred to as a ‘prima facie’ showing.” …
In step two, “the burden shifts to the prosecution to ‘offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question.’” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203). “‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’” …
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In the final step of the analysis, the trial court “must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209. The trial court must evaluate the persuasiveness of the step two justification. …
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One reason offered by the State as a reason for the strike was that “when [defense counsel] questioned [Juror Wilson] about whether or not he would stop if a police officer asked him to stop, he said no, I wouldn’t stop.” … The record does not, in fact, reveal that Juror Wilson said he would not stop for the police officer. …
The second reason offered by the State for the strike was a demeanor-based explanation. Roach argues that the proffered “body language” reason for striking Juror Wilson cannot support the strike because the trial court failed to make a finding that the demeanor-based reason was credible. …
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Our supreme court also relied on Snyder when it decided Addison, 962 N.E.2d 1202. … Ultimately, our supreme court determined: “The State’s mischaracterization of Turner’s voir dire testimony, its failure to engage Turner in any meaningful voir dire examination to explore his alleged undue reliance on the testimony of professionals, and the comparative juror analysis, when taken collectively, leave us with the firm impression that the State’s proffered explanation for striking venire person Turner was a mere pretext based on race, making a fair trial impossible.” The court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the Batson violation.
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Although Indiana courts have not specifically required credibility findings in all Batson challenges involving demeanor-based reasons, we are left here with little ability to review the trial court’s decision without such findings. Although the State professed two reasons for striking Juror Wilson, we have concluded that one of the reasons was not supported by the record, leaving only the demeanor based reason for Juror Wilson’s dismissal. It is impossible for us to determine which reason the trial court used to deny the Batson challenge or if it found both reasons persuasive. As in Snyder, we cannot presume that the trial court “credited the prosecutor’s assertion” that Juror Wilson’s body language was inappropriate. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479, 128 S. Ct. at 1209. … Although we recognize the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of a trial court recalling a prospective juror’s demeanor months after the trial, given our deference to the trial court in such matters, we believe this course should be our first step. If, of course, the trial court is unable to recall the prospective juror’s demeanor and make a determination regarding the credibility of the State’s reason for the strike, a new trial is required.
We remand for the trial court to make findings regarding the State’s demeanor based reason for striking Juror Wilson. Remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.