May, J.
Angel Shores Mobile Home Park, Inc. (“Angel Shores”) appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to John and Megan Crays (“the Crays”). [Footnote omitted.] Angel Shores presents multiple issues for our consideration. Consolidated and restated they are:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded the Crays attorney’s fees under the Child Wrongful Death Statute (“CWDS”);
2. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded the Crays litigation expenses under the CWDS; and
3. Whether the trial court erred when it did not reduce the amount of litigation expenses due to the Crays based on the percentage of Angel Shores’ fault.
The Crays cross-appeal, arguing Angel Shores waived its appeal of these issues as part of the parties’ Agreed Stipulation. [Footnote omitted.] We affirm.
….
…Angel Shores argues the Crays cannot recover attorney’s fees under the CWDS. The propriety of awarding attorney’s fees in wrongful death actions has been discussed in recent appellate opinions, e.g., McCabe v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Insurance, 949 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2011) (Adult Wrongful Death Statute), and SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675 (Ind. 2015) (General Wrongful Death Statute). However, the ability to recover attorney’s fees under the CWDS, in particular, is an issue of first impression in Indiana.
….
The CWDS provides that a plaintiff in an action alleging the wrongful death of a child may recover damages to pay the expense of “the administration of the child’s estate, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(f)(3)(E). Angel Shores contends that because the Crays filed their complaint in their capacity as Zachary’s parents pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-23-2-1(c), rather than as personal representatives administering Zachary’s estate, the Crays are not entitled to separate payment of attorney’s fees. [Footnote omitted.] Countering this argument, the Crays direct us to McCabe and SCI Propane for the proposition that, as with the AWDS, the CWDS amplifies the remedies provided by the GWDS, and that because they fall within the second category of the GWDS, as set forth in SCI Propane, they are entitled to attorney fees separate from the award of compensatory damages.
We agree with the Crays. The nature of their action brings them within the second category set forth in SCI Propane: that of a plaintiff seeking relief for the death of a dependent child. SCI Propane, 39 N.E.3d at 678. As in McCabe, the CWDS operates as a “mere amplification” of those remedies available under the GWDS. See McCabe, 949 N.E.2d at 840 (indicating the AWDS is a “mere amplification” of the GWDS). Notably, the CWDS also amplifies the scope of persons who can pursue a wrongful death claim: not only personal representatives of estates, but parents can also bring such claims, Indiana Code § 34-23-2-1(c)(1), and the statute does not limit the payment of estate administration expenses only to personal representatives. Ind. Code § 34-23-2- 1(f)(3)(E).
Moreover, the plain language of the CWDS and caselaw interpreting the AWDS support this result…The Crays’ claim is thus one for which they may separately recover attorney’s fees under the CWDS, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Crays’ motion for fees.
B. Litigation Expenses under the CWDS
Angel Shores argues the trial court erred when it awarded litigation expenses to the Crays under the CWDS….
…We find instructive as precedent our Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions in McCabe, 949 N.E.2d at 821 (affirming trial court’s award of “costs, expenses, and attorney fees related to the administration of the wrongful death estate and the prosecution of the action” under the AWDS); Hematology-Oncology of Indiana, P.C. v. Fruits, 950 N.E.2d 294, 297 (Ind. 2011). (same holding, though limiting amount recoverable under the Medical Malpractice Act); and Indiana Patients Compensation Fund v. Brown, 949 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ind. 2011) (same holding as Fruits). Thus, we conclude expenses are recoverable under the CWDS. [Footnote omitted.]
III. Application of Comparative Fault Percentage
Angel Shores argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it assessed the entirety of the Crays’ litigation expenses against it. Angel Shores contends that under Indiana Code § 34-52-1-5, it would be liable for only 5% of the plaintiffs’ expenses, in keeping with the total allocation of comparative fault against it at trial as compared to the 95% fault rating attributed to the Wagners.
….
We disagree with this construction of the statute. We think the Legislature identified the time of judgment as the point at which litigation expenses should be allocated, and that those expenses should be allocated only among parties to the action at the time of the entry of judgment….
….
Conclusion
The parties’ Agreed Stipulation does not waive appeal of the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses because the plain language of the waiver applies to the “trial verdict,” which is a function of the jury, not the trial court, and the trial court decided the issue of attorney’s fees and damages. Regarding the issues Angel Shores brought on appeal, we conclude the CWDS, as a mere amplification of the GWDS, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses, and the trial court did not err in its assessment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.