Brown, J.
Before us is an important question we have not often had the opportunity to determine: what level of involvement by an attorney in a judge’s judicial campaign requires the judge to recuse from presiding over a case in which the attorney is involved? We apply case law, Criminal Rule 12, and the Code of Judicial Conduct to determine that here, recusal is not required.
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In October 2015, the State charged Abney with: Count 1, dealing in a narcotic drug as a level 2 felony; Count 2, possession of a narcotic drug as a level 4 felony; Count 3, possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony; Count 4, maintaining a common nuisance as a level 6 felony; and Count 5, unlawful possession of a syringe as a level 6 felony. …
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On June 23, 2016, Abney filed a motion to recuse the sitting judge, Judge William C. Menges, Jr., and argued that the elected Prosecuting Attorney Mark McCann is or recently was a member of the campaign committee of the judge and that Judge Menges had an ethical duty to disclose his relationship with Mr. McCann and/or other members of the Howard County Prosecutor’s office. …
On June 24, 2016, the court … held a hearing on Abney’s motion to recuse. Abney’s counsel stated that he spoke with Abney a couple of weeks earlier, Abney had raised a concern about whether there was a “conflict between this prosecutor,” that on June 23, 2016 he and Abney discussed a newspaper article, and that statements in the article caused him to file the motion to recuse. …
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The court stated:
… So what we have from a very practical standpoint is a legal precedent being cited that has no bearing on this case or I shouldn’t say no bearing, no application to this case and it is very easily distinguished, and, secondly, as to the argument of impartiality, we have both sides supporting my candidacy or at least the relationship, the higher parties, if you will, from both sides are supporting my candidacy, so I don’t think any impartiality can be impugned from that fact. We’ll show the Motion to Recuse denied.
The jury found Abney guilty as charged. …
The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Abney’s motion for recusal. Abney points out that the newspaper article stated that the elected prosecutor indicated that he would continue to serve on the advisory committee unless someone instructed him otherwise, that the advisory committee was the judge’s current re-election committee, the prosecutor was on the letterhead of the trial judge’s current re-election campaign, and the article was contemporaneous with his case. …
The State argues that the Judicial Qualifications Commission found that the trial judge was permitted to preside over criminal cases despite various endorsements. It points out that the article stated that the elected prosecutor, not the prosecutor in Abney’s case, had yet to participate in any election committee activities on behalf of the trial judge, and that two members of the chief public defender’s office, who were partners in defense counsel’s law firm, had also publicly endorsed the judge’s candidacy.
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Abney does not cite Ind. Criminal Rule 12 but rather argues that the trial judge should have recused under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, we recently rejected the argument that the Code of Judicial Conduct supplies a freestanding mechanism for relief, independent of a properly brought Criminal Rule 12 motion. …
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Canon 2 of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct commands: “A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially, Competently, and Diligently.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 governs the disqualification of judges …
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Both parties discuss Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). … Bloomington Magazine also filed a motion to recuse. The trial court denied Bloomington Magazine’s motions.
On appeal, we held that the mere appearance of bias and partiality may require recusal if an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality. … We found that the professional relationship between Judge Haughton and Attorney Grodner, in which Grodner served as the chairman of Judge Haughton’s 2008 election committee, was not so remote in time so as to dispel the appearance of an impropriety such that a reasonable person would have a rational basis for doubting her impartiality. …
Unlike in Bloomington Magazine in which Attorney Grodner served as the chairman of Judge Haughton’s election committee, the elected prosecutor was not the chairman and had yet to perform any election committee activities on behalf of Judge Menges at the time of the article. … Under the circumstances, we cannot say that an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality or that the trial court erred.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Abney’s convictions and sentence.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.