Baker, J.
Roy Lee Ward is an Indiana inmate on death row. In 2014, the Department of Correction (DOC) internally adopted a new method of lethally injecting inmates; the new method includes a cocktail of drugs that has never been administered in an execution in the United States. Ward filed a claim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the DOC was required to promulgate this new policy as a rule under the Administrative Rules and Procedure Act (ARPA). [Footnote omitted.] The State filed a motion to dismiss the claim, which the trial court granted. Ward now appeals. Finding that the General Assembly has not exempted the DOC from ARPA and that the statutory definition of “rule” clearly includes the DOC’s execution protocols, we reverse.
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On appeal, the State abandons its position taken before the trial court and instead argues that ARPA does not apply to the DOC’s execution protocols…Ind. Code § 35-38-6-1 (emphasis added). The State focuses on the word “may” in subsection (d), arguing that this permissive word means that, while the DOC has the option of promulgating execution protocol rules under ARPA, it is not required to do so.
We disagree. Initially, we note that the lethal injection statute must be read in conjunction with ARPA. ARPA explicitly excludes two state agencies from its provisions, and neither is the DOC. I.C. § 4-22-2-13(b) (excluding any military officer or board and any state educational institution from ARPA). If the legislature intended to exempt the DOC from the purview of ARPA altogether, or even to exempt the DOC’s execution protocols, it could have easily done so, but it has not. The DOC insists that requiring it to comply with ARPA in the context of the death penalty is burdensome and unworkable. But it is not the role of the judiciary to determine the statutory obligations of State agencies; that rests with the General Assembly. We can only conclude that, by omitting the DOC from the list of entities excluded from ARPA, the General Assembly has determined that the DOC is, indeed, bound to follow it. [Footnote omitted.]
Having reached that conclusion, the plain meaning of Indiana Code section 35- 38-6-1(d) becomes clear. The DOC is not required to adopt rules. But if it chooses to do so, it is bound to follow ARPA. The DOC’s approach would require us to ignore ARPA altogether, which we may not and shall not do. The legislature has determined that DOC is not exempt from ARPA; consequently, when it adopts rules, it must comply with the procedures set forth in ARPA. [Footnote omitted.] What we must determine next, therefore, is whether the DOC’s lethal injection protocol constitutes a rule.
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It is readily apparent that the definition of “rule” encompasses the DOC’s execution protocol. The protocol has general applicability (as opposed to applicability only to a specific case) and prospective application. It has the effect of law in that it is binding on DOC employees and death row inmates. And it certainly affects a class of individuals’ rights—all prisoners scheduled to be put to death in Indiana following the 2014 announcement.
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The General Assembly has defined what a rule is in the context of ARPA. That definition clearly includes the DOC’s execution protocol. A change in that execution protocol, therefore, is a new rule that may not be implemented until the DOC complies with ARPA. Given the legislature’s determination that the DOC is not exempt from ARPA, as well as the way in which it has defined “rule,” we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s order granting the dismissal of Ward’s complaint. [Footnote omitted.] As a matter of law, DOC must comply with ARPA when changing its execution protocol, and its failure to do so in this case means that the changed protocol is void and without effect.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.