Altice, J.
Case Summary
The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) appeals from the trial court’s denial of their petition alleging that M.B. (Child) was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). On appeal, DCS argues that the trial court’s order was contrary to law.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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These statements are problematic in a number of ways. It is apparent from the trial court’s statements that it found that DCS had not set forth evidence sufficient to trigger the application of the Presumption Statute because it had not introduced evidence establishing a reasonable probability that Child’s injuries were not accidental. In doing so, the trial court rejected the physicians’ unanimous opinions. Although a fact-finder is not obligated to credit expert testimony, in this case the trial court’s statements make it clear that its decision was driven by a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law.
As an initial matter, the trial court stated that whether Child’s injuries were non-accidental was a question of law. The manner in which Child was injured, and specifically whether the injuries were non-accidental, is a question of fact. The trial court’s mischaracterization of this issue as a question of law is of particular concern because it effectively required the court to disregard the physicians’ testimony that Child’s injuries were non-accidental. See Vaughn v. Daniel Co. (West Virginia), Inc., 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2006) (explaining that “Indiana Evidence Rule 704 permits opinions to embrace ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, but prohibits opinions as to legal conclusions”).
Furthermore, although the trial court gave no indication that it questioned the qualifications of the physicians who testified in this case, the court appears to have concluded that physicians are, as a matter of law, unqualified to opine as to whether injuries are non-accidental. The trial court went so far as to call the idea that trained medical professionals can determine whether an injury was inflicted non-accidentally “frankly absurd.” Transcript at 148. We emphatically reject this approach.
Identifying the cause of a patient’s injuries is a matter squarely within the purview of medical science. Indeed, in many cases, doctors or other medical professionals with the appropriate training and experience will be the only individuals with the expertise required to understand and explain the biomechanical forces necessary to produce certain types of injuries. Such testimony is of particular importance in cases such as this one, where a very young infant has numerous serious injuries for which the parents have provided no plausible explanation. The trial court’s view also overlooks the fact that doctors routinely testify concerning whether injuries are accidental and Indiana appellate courts regularly rely upon such testimony….Although a fact-finder is not required to credit a particular physician’s opinion as to the cause of a child’s injuries, to conclude that all such testimony is improper or inherently lacking probative value would undermine numerous criminal convictions and civil judgments and leave vulnerable children at risk for further abuse by creating a virtually insurmountable evidentiary obstacle for DCS in some CHINS cases.
The trial court’s statements also suggest that it imposed an inappropriately high evidentiary burden on DCS to trigger the Presumption Statute….Thus, DCS need only produce some relevant and admissible evidence tending to establish the elements of the Presumption Statute in order to shift the burden of production to the parents or custodians.
In this case, DCS undoubtedly did so. There is no question that Child was seriously injured, and the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing established that from the time of his birth until his removal, Child was continuously in his parents’ care. [Footnote omitted.] Additionally, three physicians concluded based on their training and experience that Child’s injuries were non-accidental and indicative of child abuse. This evidence was competent and probative, and therefore sufficient to trigger the application of the Presumption Statute and shift the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption to Child’s parents.
In light of the legal errors committed by the trial court, we need not address Mother’s arguments that the denial of the CHINS petition was nevertheless supported by the evidence. Because we cannot say with confidence that the trial court’s legal errors did not affect its ultimate decision in this case, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the CHINS petition and remand with instructions to conduct further proceedings consistent with this decision. [Footnote omitted.]
Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.