Rucker, J.
In this personal injury case arising out of an automobile collision we explore among other things whether and under what circumstances a drunk driver’s prior alcohol-related driving convictions can be introduced into evidence.
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We begin by observing that although citing Rule 403 Sims does not concede that evidence of his prior convictions were relevant for any purpose at all. Indeed at oral argument when asked whether his position was that the evidence was not relevant or whether it was relevant but should not have been admitted because of unfair prejudice Sims was equivocal. See Oral Argument at 12:28-13:19 (stating “our position is both”); see also Corrected Appellant’s Br. in Response to Pet. to Trans. at 9 n.6 (“Sims does not concede that evidence of his prior convictions was relevant and admissible as to punitive damages.”). In any event, we agree with our Court of Appeals colleagues that evidence of Sims’ prior convictions was “not relevant” with respect to “compensatory damages and loss of consortium.” Sims, 61 N.E.2d at 1286. But in addition to seeking compensatory damages and damages for loss of consortium Sims also sought punitive damages. In our view the question thus presented is whether evidence of Sims’ prior convictions was relevant on this narrow point. [Footnote omitted.]
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As the Court of Appeals has previously observed evidence of similar acts may be admissible “because of the light which it throws on the state of mind of a person, as for example, his knowledge, motive or intent.” Lindley v. Oppegaard, 275 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971). The Court of Appeals has also held “evidence of [the tortfeasor’s] four previous DUI convictions was clearly relevant to his state of mind at the time of the accident and whether his actions were willful and wanton justifying the imposition of punitive damages.” Davidson v. Bailey, 826 N.E.2d 80, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We agree with these precedents and conclude that evidence of Sims’ two prior similar acts had at least some, if not substantial, “tendency” in demonstrating whether Sims’ conduct at the time of the collision was a conscious and voluntary act committed in reckless disregard of the consequences of others. The evidence was thus relevant within the meaning Rule 401.
We hasten to emphasize the evidence was relevant only on the issue of punitive damages. It had no bearing on and thus was not relevant to compensatory and loss of consortium damages. In essence the evidence was relevant and potentially admissible for a limited purpose only. If either party were concerned that the jury may view the evidence more broadly or for otherwise unintended purposes, then our Rules of Evidence and Trial Rules provide a safe harbor….
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Essentially, neither Rule 403 nor 609 imposes a temporal component on the admissibility of prior offense evidence. But the temporal component notwithstanding we are still left with the query of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. To be sure evidence of a prior conviction is certainly prejudicial….
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Here, given the underlying rationale for admission of past criminal offenses, we conclude the remoteness of a prior offense does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. A 30-year old prior offense may have just as much persuasive force as a 30-day old prior offense. In sum we conclude that although evidence of Sims’ prior conviction was prejudicial it was not unfairly so. In the end we are of the view that the remoteness of a prior offence is a matter of weight to be determined by the jury—not a matter of admissibility. Stated somewhat differently, the parties can argue, and the factfinder can determine, just how much weight to give a remote-in-time criminal conviction. But the fact of an otherwise stale conviction does render the evidence inadmissible as matter of law. In this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Sims’ 1983 and 1996 alcohol-related traffic offenses.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur