Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
This appeal arises from a discovery dispute between L.G. (“Father”)1 and S.L. and W.L. (“Adoptive Parents”) that resulted in the dismissal of Father’s motion to contest the adoption of his putative child, Infant Male R. (“Child”), and the trial court’s entry of a decree of adoption. The overarching issue is whether Father caused undue delay in the proceeding when he objected to Adoptive Parents’ repeated requests for the release of his mental health records. Adoptive Parents characterized Father’s objections to their requests for those records as unjustified attempts to thwart and delay the adoption proceeding. But Father had a right to object to the unqualified release of his mental health records, and it was Adoptive Parents’ failure to comply with the Indiana Code that delayed the proceeding until April 11, 2016. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed Father’s petition to contest the adoption on procedural grounds, which prevented Father from vindicating his parental rights.
We hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed Father’s motion to contest the adoption. The record on appeal demonstrates that Father has been actively engaged in protecting his putative parental rights over Child. Father filed both a putative father affidavit and a petition to establish paternity before Child’s birth. He then filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition, a motion to contest the adoption, a petition to revoke Adoptive Parents’ temporary custody of Child, and a petition for parenting time. He both propounded and responded to discovery, which included signing authorizations for the release of his mental health records following a hearing on Adoptive Parents’ request for those records as required by statute. And, prior to the final hearing, he participated in two hearings in person and in other hearings by counsel or by telephone. In sum, Father did not unduly delay the proceeding.
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Issue Four: Recusal on Remand
Finally, we address, sua sponte, whether the trial judge should recuse himself on remand. We first note that Father moved the trial judge to recuse himself after counsel for Adoptive Parents wrote a letter of recommendation in support of the trial judge’s application to the Indiana Supreme Court while this proceeding was pending in the trial court. Counsel for Adoptive Parents characterized Father’s recusal motion as “simply another attempt to get a continuance,” but we conclude that the motion was made for good cause, and we agree with Father that the judge should have recused himself at that time. [Footnote omitted.]
Following Justice Dickson’s retirement announcement in November 2015, Judge Nation applied for the impending vacancy on the court. In his application, Judge Nation was required to provide the names of three attorneys who had been professional adversaries in the course of his practice or who had litigated substantial cases in his court and “who would be in positions to comment on [his] qualifications for appointment to the Indiana Supreme Court.” Appellant’s Supp. App. Vol. II at 8. Judge Nation designated Adoptive Parents’ counsel, Rice, as one of his three references. Accordingly, on February 4, 2016, three days after Adoptive Parents’ motion to compel, Rice wrote a letter to the Judicial Nominating Commission in which he endorsed Judge Nation’s application and described him as “the greatest jurist” he had encountered in his “state-wide” litigation practice. Id. at 2. On March 9, the court granted the motion to compel and ordered production of Father’s mental health records, even though, as explained above, Adoptive parents had wholly failed to comply with the mental health records statutes.
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But there is more here. In his application—submitted shortly before the adoption petition was filed in this case—Judge Nation expressly identified and designated Rice as one of his three required references. Rice subsequently wrote a letter of recommendation while this case was pending in Judge Nation’s court. Rice’s letter was not merely one of many letters, and it was not a gratuitous or coincidental endorsement. It was an integral part of Judge Nation’s application.
The appearance of impropriety, that is, the mere appearance of bias or partiality, may require recusal if an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality. See Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The issue here is not whether the judge is biased or incapable of setting aside his relationship with Rice but, rather, whether an objective person would rationally doubt the judge’s impartiality given that Rice wrote the letter of recommendation after Judge Nation had expressly designated Rice as a reference. See id. This question is larger than this particular case and implicates public confidence in the administration of justice. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kirtz v. Delaware Cir. Ct. No. 5, 916 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. 2009).
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Here, put simply, there can be no doubt that the timing of the judge’s application and Rice’s letter to the Commission demonstrates at least an appearance of impropriety. See, e.g., Kirtz, 916 N.E.2d at 661. Thus, we conclude that Judge Nation should have granted Father’s first motion to recuse.
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We have a significant concern that the trial judge—or any trial judge similarly situated—would have difficulty setting aside such findings and conclusions, including the judge’s determination that Father was not credible, in considering the evidence on remand at a final hearing on Father’s motion to contest the adoption. See, e.g., Diehl v. Clemons, 12 N.E.3d 285, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Likewise, we are concerned that, if the trial judge were to remain on the case on remand, he “may tend to lean over backwards or overreact in an effort to be fair and impartial” in light of his earlier, strongly stated positions. See Robin, 553 F.2d at 10. Under the circumstances, namely, a contentious adoption contest where the court has already entered findings and conclusions adverse to Father’s credibility and character, the trial judge “cannot reasonably be expected to erase the earlier impressions from his . . . mind[.]” Id. We must endeavor “to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Given that Father’s putative parental rights are at stake on remand, we do not take these concerns lightly, and we recommend that the trial judge recuse himself from this proceeding.
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…Finally, again, “to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14). Thus, we recommend that the trial judge recuse himself from this proceeding on remand.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.