Friedlander, Senior J.
The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s grant of Amber McHenry’s motion to dismiss her Level 2 felony charge of burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, in which the trial court essentially determined that a handgun obtained in the course of a burglary cannot support the elevated charge of burglary while armed with a deadly weapon under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1(3)(A). We affirm.
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In October 2015, Andrew Stoffel returned home to discover that his residence had been burglarized and that a handgun with three magazines and a safe containing coins and other small items had been taken. In May 2016, McHenry was charged with Count 1 burglary as a Level 2 felony and Count 2 burglary as a Level 4 felony for her alleged involvement in the crime.
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Indiana Code 35-43-2-1(3)(A) provides:
A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is:
. . . .
(3) a Level 2 felony if it:
(A) is committed while armed with a deadly weapon . . . .
Initially, we note that our statute, by its terms “committed while armed with,” does not contemplate the situation in which a burglar enters unarmed and thereafter becomes armed. This is a distinguishing feature from the statutes of other jurisdictions whose language was crafted to include just such a situation. …
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Turning to the other terms of our statute, there is no dispute that a handgun qualifies as a “deadly weapon” as that term includes “[a] loaded or unloaded firearm.” … The term “armed,” however, has not been legislatively defined in Indiana for purposes of the burglary statute. Caselaw, too, is sparse regarding a sanctioned definition of the term. Speaking very briefly on the term in a footnote, this Court remarked that it is not a technical word and should be construed in its ordinary sense. The Court then stated that the term “describes the state of being ‘equipped’ or ‘furnished’ with weapons.” Roddy v. State, 182 Ind. App. 156, 174, 394 N.E.2d 1098, 1110 n.24 (1979) (citing Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary p. 48 (1970)). Indeed, there is nothing in our burglary statute to indicate that this term is meant to have anything other than a plain and ordinary meaning. …
We think it necessary at this juncture to remark upon the fact that few courts have troubled to define “armed” while construing their burglary statutes. Rather, they have simply held that certain conduct during a burglary constitutes being armed with little or no discussion as to the meaning of that term within the confines of the particular statute and without regard to the principles of statutory construction. A review of these decisions reveals a consensus to consider a defendant to be armed if the weapon is “easily accessible and readily available for use by the defendant for either offensive or defensive purposes.” … This interpretation,
however, is not suggested by our statutory language. We are tasked with ascertaining the intent of the legislature within the purview of our rules of statutory construction, and we will not over-step these bounds by adopting a definition of a statutory term that is not developed according to these guidelines.
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On the day of the burglary, according to Dulworth, McHenry needed some heroin, and she called Boothby to pick up her, Dulworth, and Mitchell. Boothby picked up McHenry, Dulworth, and Mitchell at Mitchell’s house and drove them all to Stoffel’s residence. McHenry, Dulworth, and Mitchell went into the house while Boothby waited outside in his vehicle. … McHenry and Dulworth went into the bedroom and found the gun. McHenry exited the house with the gun in a bag, Dulworth had coins, and Mitchell had a bag of tools. Boothby then drove them to another house, where McHenry traded the gun for heroin. …
… The evidence here does not indicate that McHenry handled the gun in a manner indicative of using it or involving it in the crime in any way. On the contrary, her sole objective appears to have been the theft of items that could be traded for drugs. …
… Thus, we hold that a defendant who obtains a handgun as loot during the course of a burglary has not “armed” him or herself as that term is used in Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1(3)(A).
Judgment affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.