Massa, J.
After pleading guilty to Class D felony theft (in 2000), Wallace Irvin Smith, III entered into a plea agreement, which provided he would be “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment.” At that time, trial courts could convert sentences only at the time of sentencing. However, in 2012, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7, allowing sentences to be converted after they had been entered, subject to certain requirements. …
… As part of his plea agreement with the State, Smith agreed that he would be “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause.” The trial court accepted the agreement, and entered conviction. …
In 2015, Smith filed a “Verified Petition for Misdemeanor Treatment,” seeking to convert his Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor … Over the State’s objection, the trial court granted Smith’s petition, vacated his felony, and re-entered conviction as a Class A misdemeanor.
The State appealed, and our Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Smith, 58 N.E.3d 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This Court granted the State’s petition to transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. State v. Smith, 62 N.E.3d 1202 (Ind. 2016) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
The terms of a plea agreement between the State and the defendant are contractual in nature. Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004). When a trial court accepts a plea agreement, it is bound by its terms. Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1246 (Ind. 2014). As such, we are guided by contract interpretation principles, beginning with the agreement’s plain language and determining the intent of the parties at the time the plea was entered. …
The State argues that intervening statutory changes do not invalidate a plea agreement’s unambiguous and binding terms. Smith contends, however, that he could not have waived a right that did not exist at the time he entered into the agreement.
….
In 2012, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7, adding that “the sentencing court may convert a Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor conviction” after receiving a verified petition, conducting a hearing, and making specific findings. … “[I]t seems clear that the General Assembly has adopted a policy wherein trial courts can reward good behavior by removing the stigma of certain Class D felony convictions.” Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, in the intervening time after Smith entered into his plea agreement with the State, the legislature granted trial courts the authority to modify convictions after sentences had already been entered. …
We must therefore determine whether the language of Smith’s plea agreement foreclosed the possibility of sentence conversion. Specifically, the agreement provided he was “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause.” Our interpretation of Smith’s plea agreement is guided by contract principles. Berry, 10 N.E.3d at 1246. If the terms are unambiguous, we will apply them accordingly. Valenzuela v. State, 898 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Terms do not become ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to their proper interpretation. Id. Rather, terms are ambiguous “‘if a reasonable person would find the contract subject to more than one interpretation.’” …
We find the terms of Smith’s plea agreement unambiguous. The phrase “asking for Misdemeanor treatment” plainly encompasses and is understood to include sentence conversions. While statutory amendments creating Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(d) offered trial courts flexibility they did not previously have in the timing for converting sentences, this change did not create a new type of “misdemeanor treatment,” because the trial court is granting precisely the same relief. As such, by filing a verified petition to convert his Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor, Smith sought the very remedy he waived. The General Assembly’s later amendment to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7 did not alter this. Indeed, the language of Smith’s waiver, “in this cause,” indicates no temporal limit as to his waiver of sentence conversion.
Moreover, the legislature knows how to prevent waivers in plea agreements, and has specifically done so before. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(l) (Supp. 2016) (“A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement”); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-9-11(a) (2014) (“A person may not waive the right to expungement under this chapter as part of a plea agreement”). However, the General Assembly has not prevented waiver under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7. Precluding sentence conversion is thus a tool the State may use to strike a deal with defendants. To allow Smith to later file for sentence conversion under a statute that has been procedurally amended, but provides the same remedy, would deny the State the benefit of its bargain. …
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.