Pyle, J.
During Darren Langdon’s (“Langdon”) initial hearing, the trial court ordered him to pay a $50.00 supplemental public defender fee. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Langdon to pay a second $50.00 supplemental public defender fee. Langdon claims that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose the second fee. We agree and reverse the trial court’s imposition of the second fee.
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The trial court convicted Langdon as charged following a May 2016 bench trial and sentenced him to time served following a June 2016 sentencing hearing. Also at the sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended Langdon’s $185.00 court costs, found him to be indigent, and appointed a public defender should he decide to pursue an appeal. In a Marion County sentencing order form issued three days later, the trial court ordered Langdon to pay a second $50.00 supplemental public defender fee. … Langdon now appeals the imposition of this fee.
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We begin by noting that the three statutes listed on the Marion County sentencing order form do not support the imposition of the second supplemental public defender fee. …
… The first statute, I.C. § 33-35-7-6(a), provides that the trial court may impose a supplemental public defender fee before completing the initial hearing. Pursuant to this statute, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is indigent. … If the defendant is found to be indigent, public defender fees are $100 in felony cases and $50 in misdemeanor cases. …
The second statute, I.C. § 33-40-3-6, provides that if the trial court finds that the defendant has the ability to pay the costs of representation, the trial court shall impose reasonable attorney fees at any stage of a misdemeanor or felony prosecution. …
The third statute, I.C. § 33-37-2-3, provides that the trial court may impose part of the attorney fees upon a convicted person, provided the trial court first determines that such person is not indigent. …
Langdon is correct that none of these statutory provisions support the imposition of the second $50.00 fee. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s imposition of the second supplemental public defender fee and remand for the issuance of an amended sentencing order.
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.