David, J.
This case involves whether the brief detainment of defendant as part of a sobriety checkpoint is custodial so as to trigger Miranda protection.
In July 2013, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police set up a field sobriety checkpoint to apprehend impaired drivers. …
At some point, Defendant, David Brown, who was driving a motorcycle, entered the checkpoint. … The officer administered some field sobriety tests, and ultimately, arrested Brown.
During a bench trial, the State presented testimony and evidence about the sobriety checkpoint, generally, and about the encounter with Brown. When one of the officers testified that Brown had admitted he had been drinking, Brown’s counsel requested to ask the officer some preliminary questions. Counsel asked the officer whether the officer Mirandized Brown prior to asking him if he had been drinking, and the officer responded no. The officer further indicated that Brown was not free to go when that question was asked and that the question was asked as part of an investigation into possible impaired drivers.
Brown’s counsel then objected to the officer’s testimony about him asking Brown if he had been drinking and Brown’s response based on a Miranda violation. The State argued in response that a Miranda warning was not necessary because the checkpoint was a traffic stop and not a custodial situation.
… After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the trial court entered an order granting Brown’s motion to suppress. …
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to correct error, arguing no Miranda violation occurred, and even if it did, the other evidence (e.g., field sobriety test and Breathalyzer results) should not have been excluded. The trial court denied that motion, and the State appealed.
In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, determined that the State had no statutory authority to appeal because Brown never filed a written motion to suppress … It therefore dismissed the State’s appeal and remanded it to the trial court for further proceedings. The State then petitioned for transfer, which we granted. Ind. App. Rule 58(A).
As a threshold matter, we hold that the State can bring its appeal pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2(5). We further hold, as a matter of first impression, that Miranda warnings are not required in circumstances such as these, where a defendant is briefly detained at a public sobriety checkpoint.
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We also find that there is no meaningful distinction between traffic stops or Terry stops and the checkpoint stop in this case. In Berkemer, the U.S. Supreme Court noted two reasons why a traffic stop (or a Terry stop) does not trigger Miranda. First, it noted the temporary and brief nature of the stop … Berkemer at 438. Second, it noted the public nature of the stop . . .” Id. at 439.
Both of these reasons apply equally to the checkpoint stop in this case. … This is not to say that there cannot be a set of circumstances where a detention as part of a sobriety checkpoint is so lengthy and/or private that it triggers Miranda. … We find this safety checkpoint questioning was no more custodial than a routine traffic stop or a Terry stop.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand for further proceedings.
Rush, C. J., Massa and Slaughter, J.J., concur. Rucker, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Rucker, J. concurring in result.
Because I believe a motorist detained at a sobriety checkpoint is entitled to the protection afforded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion declaring otherwise. However, I acknowledge the United States Supreme Court has declined to expand Miranda’s reach to cases involving routine traffic stops and its reasoning is applicable to the case before us. Therefore, I am compelled to concur in result.
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