Najam, J.
Jefferson Jean-Baptiste appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Jean-Baptiste raises a single issue for our review, but we address two issues on appeal:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Jean-Baptiste’s conviction.
2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial without first securing his personal waiver of that right on the record.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that a law enforcement officer, while attempting to serve a “civil arrest warrant” on Jean-Baptiste at his home, unlawfully entered Jean-Baptiste’s home. In light of that unlawful entry, Jean-Baptiste had the right, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i), to reasonably resist the law enforcement officer. As that lawful resistance was the only basis for Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction and, thus, we reverse. We also hold, sua sponte, that the record unmistakably shows that the trial court failed to secure Jean-Baptiste’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the record. Accordingly, the trial court committed fundamental error under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it denied Jean-Baptiste’s jury’s trial request. As such, for that additional reason we also reverse.
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To prove that Jean-Baptiste committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer “while the officer [wa]s lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2015) (emphasis added). …
The instant appeal is on all fours with this court’s opinion in Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). …
… We initially noted that a writ of body attachment or civil arrest warrant “is not a criminal arrest warrant.” We noted that “[t]his distinction is important as we view the confrontation on the doorstep of Casselman’s house.” Acknowledging the vitality of the Castle Doctrine in Indiana, see I.C. § 35-41-3-2, we stated that, “in matters concerning merely civil process, the courts of this land have been zealous in protecting against the authority of the government to force entry into a private dwelling.” Casselman, 472 N.E.2d at 1314.
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We also recognize that the Indiana General Assembly recently reaffirmed its commitment to Castle Doctrine as the policy in Indiana. … In particular, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i) provides that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to . . . prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry of . . . the person’s dwelling . . . .”
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Even if we were to agree that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, we would still be obliged to reverse, sua sponte, because the trial court committed fundamental error when it denied Jean-Baptiste’s right to a jury trial without first eliciting a personal waiver from him on the record. …
Criminal Rule 22 provides:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand a trial by jury by filing a written demand therefor not later than ten (10) days before his scheduled trial date. The failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as required by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury unless the defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days advance notice of his scheduled trial date and of the consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.
Here, the record shows that Jean-Baptiste had been advised of Criminal Rule 22 and had not complied with it. Rather than complying with Rule 22, on the day of his bench trial Jean-Baptiste requested a trial by jury. The trial court denied his request solely on the basis of Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance with Rule 22. That was fundamental error. Absent his personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the record, the court was required under the Sixth Amendment to presume that a defendant charged with a Class A misdemeanor desired a jury trial, not a bench trial. … Only after that personal waiver on the record is secured may the trial court then operate under Rule 22. As that did not happen here, the trial court committed fundamental error when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial, and for that additional reason we reverse his conviction.
Reversed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.