Bailey, J.
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On July 22, 2014, Messersmith injured his four-year-old son when he forcibly pushed him against a trailer at the Madison County Fair. Messersmith was arrested, and the State brought two charges against him: (1) Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Bodily Injury, as a Level 5 felony; and (2) Battery on a Person Less Than 14 Years Old, as a Level 6 felony. Messersmith reached a plea agreement with the State whereby he would plead guilty to Count II and the State would move to dismiss Count I. At a February 23, 2015 hearing, Messersmith pleaded guilty. The trial court accepted his plea, entered judgment on Count II, and dismissed Count I.
On March 30, 2015, the State orally sought to withdraw the plea agreement because the State entered the agreement without first notifying the victim. Messersmith objected. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court entered an order granting the State’s request to withdraw the plea agreement.
A jury trial commenced on September 24, 2015, and Messersmith was convicted of both counts.
Messersmith argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, after accepting the plea agreement and entering its judgment of conviction, the trial court granted the State’s request to withdraw the plea agreement. … “We review for an abuse of discretion a decision to permit withdrawal of a plea agreement.” Dunn v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1074, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Badger v. State, 637 N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ind. 1994)).
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The State argues that the trial court properly granted the State’s motion to withdraw the plea agreement because, in doing so, the trial court accounted for the victim’s rights. The State directs us to Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, which establishes rights for crime victims. The State also directs us to portions of the Indiana Code codifying those rights. … However, in establishing rights for crime victims, Article 1, Section 13 expressly provides that a victim’s rights must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights:
Victims of crime, as defined by law, shall have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and, as defined by law, to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the prosecution, to the extent that exercising these rights does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused.
Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(b) (emphasis added).
Among a defendant’s constitutional rights is the federal right to due process supplied by the United States Constitution, which provides that a State shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. … Thus, when a defendant enters a “knowing and voluntary (and hence valid)” plea, “the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 138 (2009).
With these principles in mind, it is notable that “[w]e have, at times, held [that] trial courts have the discretion to revoke plea agreements after judgment was entered.” Dunn, 33 N.E.3d at 1076. For example, we have recognized an exception when a defendant claims innocence at a sentencing hearing, Beech v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), in which case a defendant’s inconsistent assertions raise questions about the voluntariness of the plea. … We have also recognized an exception when a defendant breaches the terms of a plea agreement, Campbell v. State, 17 N.E.3d 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), in which case principles of fairness do not demand the State’s adherence to a plea agreement that the defendant himself has breached.
The State urges that Dunn is distinguishable and, if not, asks us to reconsider Dunn. … The circumstances here, however, did offend Messersmith’s constitutional rights. This is because entry of judgment following a guilty plea implicates a defendant’s rights, Coker, 499 N.E.2d at 1138, and due process requires that the government uphold its side of the bargain. Santobello, U.S. 257 at 262. Thus, Messersmith’s due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed the State to avoid the agreement over Messersmith’s objection. Although Indiana law establishes important victim rights, those rights must give way to a defendant’s federal due process rights. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(b). We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State’s request to withdraw the plea agreement.
… We reverse and order the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with the plea agreement and sentence Messersmith within the bounds of the plea agreement.
Reversed.
Najam, J., and May, J., concur.