Baker, J.
Devonte Owens appeals his sentence for Carrying a Handgun Without a License, arguing that he was denied due process at his sentencing hearing. …
On August 15, 2015, Officer Brett Bousema of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department made a traffic stop after observing a car make several traffic violations. … When Officer Bousema opened the door to the vehicle, he observed a handgun between the passenger seat and the car door.
The State charged Owens with carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor. After an April 25, 2016, bench trial, the trial court found Owens guilty as charged. The trial court remanded Owens to the custody of the Marion County Sheriff, at which time the following exchange occurred:
Defense Counsel: Judge, Mr. Owens is working, he’s a college student, he will lose the job that he just received. We would ask that we either proceed to sentencing today, or that he be allowed to self-report. He’s not missed work.
The Court: Who says he’s going to be going to Community Corrections?
Defense Counsel: No, self-report for sentencing. He’s not missed court. He does not have a significant criminal history.
The Court: Well, when you go to trial, you expect to go to jail today. …
….
Defense Counsel: Judge, may we be heard as to sentencing, Judge, the mitigating factors.
The Court: We just submitted the sentencing.
Defense Counsel: Understand, but we didn’t have an opportunity to argue, or to present argument for sentencing.
The Court: Go ahead.
Defense Counsel: I can’t elicit testimony from my client?
The Court: I mean, the Court has made its ruling. The Court has made its ruling.
Defense Counsel: If he gets taken into custody today, he’s going to lose—
The Court: Well, he’s going to get an opportunity to go to Community Corrections.
….
The Court: This is not a plea agreement, lest I remind you, Ms.—this is a trial.
Defense Counsel: That’s correct. He exercised his right to trial.
….
The Court: I’ve made my ruling.
Defense Counsel: He’d be able to maintain his employment to pay for court costs.
The Court: He is going to jail. He is going to jail and he’ll be picked up and that’s my ruling. Thank you.
….
Owens argues that the trial court denied him due process during sentencing when it failed to advise him of his right to speak on his own behalf, failed to give him an opportunity to make a statement, and failed to allow his counsel to make a meaningful sentencing argument. We agree.
To resolve the issue, we turn to our statute governing the right of allocution. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-5 provides that:
When the defendant appears for sentencing, the court shall inform the defendant of the verdict of the jury or the finding of the court. The court shall afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant. The defendant may also make a statement personally in the defendant’s own behalf and, before pronouncing sentence, the court shall ask the defendant whether the defendant wishes to make such a statement. Sentence shall then be pronounced, unless a sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the court for delay in sentencing.
Emphases added. “‘The right of allocution is minimally invasive of the sentencing proceeding; the requirement of providing the defendant a few moments of court time is slight.’” Vicory v. State, 802 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind. 2004) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1991)).
… The record also reveals that the trial court did not advise Owens of his right to speak on his own behalf or give him an opportunity to make a statement … We do not find that the brief, pre-sentencing statement made by Owens’s attorney qualifies as a meaningful sentencing argument made on behalf of Owens. … The trial court’s failure to allow Owens’s counsel to make a meaningful sentencing argument, advise Owens of his right to speak on his own behalf, or provide Owens an opportunity to make a statement constitutes a clear denial of Owens’s right to due process and an abdication of the trial court’s statutory obligations.
We are dismayed by the trial court’s disregard for the statute that governs a defendant’s rights during sentencing. … We understand that trial courts are busy, but to be so curt with defendants and their counsel, as the trial court was here, is penny wise and pound foolish—the denial of due process only leads us back to where defense counsel wanted us to be during sentencing, but at the expense of our taxpayers. See Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.8(B) (“A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants . . . lawyers . . . and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity . . .”).
We take this opportunity to remind trial courts of their statutory duty to afford criminal defendants the rights that our General Assembly intended them to have during sentencing.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.