May, J.
Rachel Neal appeals a summary judgment in favor of IAB Financial Bank (“the Bank”). She argues the trial court erred in finding the Bank owed no duty toward her. [Footnote omitted.] We affirm.
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On September 27, 2012, Gabriel Biddle drove into the Bank’s parking lot because he had a flat tire….
The Bank employees helped Biddle change his tire, and afterward they noticed he “kind of staggered.”… Biddle was later involved in a traffic accident that injured Neal.
Neal sued the Bank, alleging she would not have been injured in the accident but for the Bank employees’ negligent act of helping Biddle change his tire so he could get back on the road. [Footnote omitted.]
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Here, Biddle, who had no relationship with the Bank, pulled into the Bank parking lot in the middle of the day with a flat tire. It was not until after the Bank employees finished helping him change the tire, and Biddle was on his way, that the Bank employees became concerned Biddle might be intoxicated. The Bank’s assistant manager then called 911 to report the incident because “they were concerned for Biddle’s safety and for the safety of the motoring public.” (Appellant’s App. at 62.) Unlike in Buchanan, where Vowell was the mother of the intoxicated driver, here, there was no relationship between Biddle and the Bank employees. In addition, the nature of the Bank employees’ conduct here is drastically different than Vowell’s, as Vowell deliberately assisted her daughter in committing tortious behavior, i.e., Vowell was on the telephone to help her daughter drive while intoxicated. Here, Biddle happened upon the Bank employees with a flat tire, and the Bank employees, acting out of a Good Samaritan reflex, simply helped a distressed motorist change his tire.
…Similarly, here, the Bank employees were not in a superior position to supervise or protect Biddle, nor did they have any right or duty to control his actions.
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Because we find no special relationship existed between the Bank and Biddle, or between the Bank and Neal, and the Bank did not create any special relationship by gratuitously assuming a duty, we conclude the relationship of the parties weighs in favor of no duty here. [Footnote omitted.]
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Applying this foreseeability analysis to the case at hand, our inquiry is whether a duty should be imposed on the Bank, a financial institution, to take precautions to protect motorists on the public roadways from the potential of a stranded motorist being intoxicated, before it gratuitously attempts to render aid to that stranded motorist. Being stranded due to a flat tire is commonplace on roadways. And, we acknowledge, the incidence of intoxicated drivers on roadways continues to be higher than ideal. However, we cannot say drunk drivers routinely stop at places of business seeking aid during the middle of the day. It is therefore not reasonably foreseeable to a third person – whether it be an individual or business – who acts as Good Samaritan, that a stranded motorist to whom they render aid will harm another motorist on the public roadway. To require every individual who undertakes to aid a stranded motorist to safeguard against the possibility that motorist may be intoxicated would be requiring those individuals to ensure the safety of all motorists. We do not believe reasonable persons would recognize such a duty exists.
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In the same way, we note public policy should encourage rendering aid or assisting stranded motorists on the roadways, not dis-incentivize it. Were we to impose a duty on all individuals to consider the potential risk of harm to third persons before helping motorists in peril, it would require those individuals to weigh their personal risk of exposure to liability to third persons injured by the motorist against the motorist’s immediate need for assistance. We refuse to impose such a duty.
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Conclusion
Because all three of the Webb factors lean against imposing a duty here, the trial court did not err in concluding the Bank owed no duty to Neal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.