Baker, J.
The Harrison County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to correct error in which the Sheriff argued that it was entitled to judgment on the evidence. The trial court’s order came after a jury returned a verdict in favor of Leandra Ayers, representative of the Estate of Christine Britton (the Estate), for $1.2 million. The jury found the Sheriff vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Christine’s husband, Sheriff’s Deputy John Britton, knew that Christine had expressed suicidal thoughts but left her in a room by herself with his gun. The Sheriff argues that there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, that John was acting in the scope of his employment during the incident, and that the trial court made several errors in the admission of evidence and in its jury instructions. Finding that John’s actions were undertaken in a purely private capacity and had no connection to his employment as a sheriff’s deputy, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the Sheriff’s motion to correct error.
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Regarding the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Estate’s central argument is that a police officer is always on duty. The current county Sheriff testified that the department has a “sheep dog philosophy and that sheep dog philosophy is one that the sheep dog is always protecting the flock.” Tr. p. 424. More specifically, the Estate argues that John was furthering his employer’s interests when subduing Christine and preventing her from reaching his gun because the Sheriff is charged with the authority to apprehend any individual who appears mentally ill and in need of treatment. Ind. Code § 12-26-4-1. The Estate argues that, at a minimum, several of John’s acts were authorized by the Sheriff, and that therefore the issue should be considered a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of law.
We cannot agree that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply to the particular facts of this case. In all of his relevant acts, John was acting as a husband, not a sheriff’s deputy. He was not standing in his own bedroom by dint of the Sheriff’s authorization—he was in the bedroom in a purely private capacity, in the most intimate setting possible, of one spouse engaging with another spouse. Under these circumstances, John’s conduct can in no way be tied or attributed to his employer, the Sheriff. The Estate is correct to note that an employee can still be within the scope of his employment if there is a mixture of motives, and that the Estate is not required to “show that the acts of the employee were motivated solely or predominately by the desire to serve the employer.” Dodson v. Carlson, 14 N.E.3d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But we find that the evidence in this case, construed in the Estate’s favor, shows that John was acting solely, not just predominately, in a private capacity.
Although we have held that where some acts of the employee are authorized by his employer, the issue of whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment becomes a question for the jury, we do not believe that the word “authorized” should be read as broadly as simply “not unauthorized.” In every case upholding the vicarious liability of an employer, there is some minimal nexus between the employee’s work and the facts of the case. See, e.g., Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 245 (employer instructed, and therefore authorized, employee to bathe resident of facility, which then shifted into sexual assault); Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (employer instructed, and therefore authorized, equipment manager to fit boys with uniforms, which then shifted into that manager committing molestations); Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 224-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (employer instructed, and therefore authorized, private security officer to maintain order in apartment complex, which then shifted into that officer committing several crimes). In the present case, we cannot point to any instruction given by the Sheriff to John that placed him into the situation that resulted in Christine’s death. Indeed, we cannot find a single act or omission committed by John that he would not have done as a member of an entirely different profession. Because there is not even a slight nexus between his job as a sheriff’s deputy and his actions in his own bedroom, none of his acts were “authorized” for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and the question of his scope of employment should have never gone before the jury.
If we were to accept the Estate’s argument, we can find little reason that any police department would not be found vicariously liable for every act of its officers and deputies. Every police department has an interest in its employees advancing its goal of crime prevention. Because every officer is at all times authorized to reduce the level of crime, whether on or off duty, the Estate’s position would turn every crime or tort committed by an officer into a question of fact for a jury. Perhaps there would be some limit based on the officer’s jurisdiction, as in Moore, 706 N.E.2d at 604, where we found that the city could not be held liable for the actions of an officer committed outside of the city. But that would not be a viable limit for county deputies, whose jurisdiction extends over hundreds of square miles. It certainly would not be a viable limit for State Troopers, whose jurisdiction extends over the entire state.
In short, because John’s actions took place in the most private and intimate of circumstances, during an argument between two spouses, while he was off duty, in an encounter to which the Sheriff had absolutely no connection, as a matter of law the Sheriff cannot be held vicariously liable for his crimes.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the Sheriff’s motion to correct error consistent with this opinion.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.