Crone, J.
Case Summary
Russell F. Dumka appeals from the trial court’s order denying garnishment of an individual retirement account inherited by Lori Erickson from her husband. Although he concedes that the asset is exempt from garnishment, he argues that the trial court erred by applying the statutory exemption because it was Lori’s burden to assert the exemption and she failed to do so. Concluding that the order complies with the evidence and the law, we affirm.
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Dumka concedes that the IRA is exempt from garnishment pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2(c)(6) and that Lori would have been entitled to it if she had timely asserted the exemption…
Although the general rule is that exemptions to attachment must be asserted by the debtor, our supreme court has recognized exceptions. Branham v. Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011); Mims v. Commercial Credit Corp., 261 Ind. 591, 596, 307 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1974)…
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Like the debtors in Branham and Mims, Lori was unrepresented. Based on the undisputed facts, the IRA is lawfully exempt from attachment. Her failure and the trial court’s failure to initially recognize that the IRA was lawfully exempt is of no consequence. The trial court may take judicial notice of public statutory law, and it may take judicial notice on its own at any stage of the proceeding. Ind. Evid. Rule 201(b), -(c), -(d). [Footnote omitted.]The trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of Section 34-55-10-2(c)(6). See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1157; see also Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he trial court is presumed to know the law, and apply it correctly.”) Dumka has failed to establish prima facie error. We conclude that the Order complies with the evidence and the law, and therefore we affirm.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.