Rucker, J.
Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief contending his plea of guilty to four class A felony offenses was invalid because at the time Petitioner entered the plea he also professed his innocence. …
On November 9, 2010, the State charged eighteen-year-old Demajio Ellis and his sixteen-year-old cousin, Shawn Alexander, with two counts of attempted murder as class A felonies and two counts of attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury also as class A felonies. …
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Ellis entered an agreement with the State that called for him to plead guilty to all four class A felony offenses. … Although pleading guilty to all four counts, when asked about his involvement in the events leading to charged crimes, Ellis stated in part: “I didn’t do nothing, you know, sir. I was involved to the point that I did hit somebody, but I didn’t cut nobody. I did not rob nobody, sir.” And when specifically asked about his knowledge of and participation in the assaults that Alexander committed against the victims, Ellis affirmed: “I did tell him don’t do it, sir, you know.” …
On June 22, 2011, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing at which Ellis again expressed his innocence and indicated that he wished to withdraw his plea of guilty. After an extended back and forth colloquy with the trial court, Ellis reversed course and decided not to withdraw his guilty plea. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement the trial court sentenced Ellis to one hundred years imprisonment with sixty years suspended to probation for an aggregate sentence of forty years executed.
In 2013 Ellis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief that was later amended by counsel. The amended petition challenged Ellis’ plea in three respects: (1) it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; (2) the plea lacked a factual basis; and (3) the trial court erred in accepting the plea in light of Ellis’ protestations of innocence. After a hearing at which Ellis testified on his own behalf, the post-conviction court ultimately entered an order denying relief. It issued no findings of fact and conclusions thereon with respect to Ellis’ third claim.
On appeal Ellis raised a single issue, namely whether the trial court committed reversible error in accepting Ellis’ guilty plea in light of his protestation of innocence. In a memorandum decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. See Ellis v. State, 50 N.E.3d 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (Table). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. …
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Over half a century ago, we declared: “[A] plea of guilty tendered by one who in the same breath protests his innocence, or declares he actually does not know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all. Certainly it is not a sufficient plea upon which to base a judgment of conviction.” Harshman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind. 1953). …
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… the evidence presented rests solely on the strength of Ellis’ testimony and his admission of guilt to the charges.
It is also instructive that although the record shows Ellis was charged as a principal, the apparent theory under which he pleaded guilty was that of an accomplice. …
There is no dispute that Alexander took a substantial step toward the act of murder by cutting the victims’ throats. However, the transcript is entirely devoid of evidence showing Ellis’ “specific intent that the killing occur.” … Without a showing of Ellis’ specific intent that Alexander commit the killings, the factual basis is incomplete. See D.A. v. State, 967 N.E.2d 59, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) …
… It is clear that at the same time Ellis was pleading guilty he was also professing his innocence. The State does not seriously contest this point. Instead the State insists that Ellis did not “consistently” maintain his innocence. …
To support its contention that Ellis did not “consistently” maintain his innocence, the State relies on Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. 2000). But its reliance is misplaced. In that case the defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. “He was fully and properly advised of his constitutional rights and the implications of his plea. He affirmed that the plea was made freely and voluntarily, and without duress. [And] [h]e gave a factual account of the circumstances of the crime.” … Here … Ellis claimed innocence in both proceedings.
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On de novo review we conclude that by a preponderance of the evidence the petitioner has demonstrated that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to the conclusion the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for relief. We therefore reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.