Altice, J.
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On November 16, 2015, Baker was involved in an automobile accident … in Indianapolis. … Baker was arrested and charged with two counts relating to his operation of a vehicle while intoxicated.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Baker pled guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person … On May 4, 2016, the trial court held a restitution hearing at which Apollos testified that she was driving her father’s 1996 Buick Park Avenue at the time of the accident and that the car was totaled. Insurance paid her father $1,718.81 for the Park Avenue. As a replacement for her father’s car, Apollos purchased a 2002 Buick Century for $3,800.00. Apollos paid the $2,082 difference between the insurance payout and the cost of the Buick Century with her own funds. … The trial court … ordered Baker to pay $2,082.00 in restitution to Apollos. …
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“[T]he principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused, and that restitution also serves to compensate the victim.” Morgan v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1091, 1093-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Iltzsch v. State, 981 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ind. 2013)).
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Accordingly, a restitution order must reflect a loss sustained by the victim “as a direct and immediate result” of the defendant’s criminal acts. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The amount of actual loss is a factual matter to be determined upon the presentation of evidence. …
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… for restitution purposes, the replacement cost is the value of the destroyed item at the time of the loss. Here, that amount would be the value of the Park Avenue at the time of the accident. … The trial court, however, improperly based its restitution order on the $3,800 cost of 2002 Buick Century Apollos purchased as a replacement minus the insurance payment. …
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… the trial court abused its discretion in basing its restitution order on the amount Apollos paid for the Buick Century and then awarding her the difference between the insurance payout and the cost of that car. We remand to the trial court with instructions to enter a restitution order for the value of the Park Avenue prior to the accident.
As a second issue, Baker argues that the trial court erred by not inquiring into his ability to pay the restitution awarded to Apollos. … When the trial court orders restitution as a condition of probation, the court is required to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6) … Where restitution is ordered as part of an executed sentence, an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay is not required. Pearson, at 773 (citing Shaffer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
The parties make competing arguments as to how to classify the restitution order—as a condition of probation or a part of the executed sentence. … despite the fact that the trial court did not check a separate box indicating restitution was a condition of probation, we think that restitution was clearly intended as such. Consequently, it was incumbent on the trial court to inquire into Baker’s ability to pay and to fix the manner of performance with
regard to the payment of restitution. See Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 963 (Ind. 2016) (citing Pearson, 883 N.E.2d at 772). On remand, the trial court is directed to make such inquiry.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.