Baker, J.
Rodney Tyms-Bey brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to strike his notice of defense under Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). …
On June 24, 2013, the State notified Tyms-Bey that the Department of Revenue had determined that he had falsely reported his income and eligible tax deductions for the tax year 2012 and that he owes the State $1,042.82. … On August 6, 2014, the State charged Tyms-Bey with three counts of class D felony tax evasion.
On July 1, 2015, the date Indiana’s RFRA statute took effect, Tyms-Bey filed a notice of defense of religious freedom. The State moved to strike the defense. On January 6, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to strike. At the hearing, Tyms-Bey refused to identify what religious practice or belief was burdened by the State’s actions and stated that he believed he was entitled to present his defense to a jury and would provide all evidence at trial. The State argued that a defense of religious freedom is unavailable as a defense to failure to pay taxes. The trial court granted the State’s motion to strike, and Tyms-Bey now brings this interlocutory appeal.
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Tyms-Bey invites us to address a number of broad issues surrounding RFRA and its application to criminal cases. … We will assume solely for argument’s sake that Tyms-Bey pleaded a RFRA defense properly and met his burden of showing that this prosecution substantially burdens his exercise of religion. Having made those assumptions, we need decide only whether—as a matter of law—the State’s enforcement of its income tax laws is in furtherance of a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. In other words, we must determine whether, viewing the situation in a light most favorable to a defendant facing criminal income tax penalties, that defendant could ever raise a successful RFRA defense. We hold that he could not.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the compelling interest in the collection of taxes and the absolute necessity of uniform and mandatory participation in the tax system. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982) …
In Indiana, our General Assembly has carved out a statutory exception to the protections of RFRA. Specifically, the government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if the government’s imposition of the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. I.C. § 34-13-9-8(b). …
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In other words, in the case at hand, regardless of the State’s chosen enforcement mechanism, the “burden” that Tyms-Bey wants to avoid is the same—the requirement that he pay taxes. …
We adopt the analysis of the Lee Court and hold as a matter of law that, in the context of Indiana’s RFRA, there is a compelling governmental interest in collecting income tax revenue. Moreover, we hold as a matter of law that the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest is uniform and mandatory participation in the income tax system. … In other words, as a matter of law, Indiana’s RFRA offers no protection for the allegedly criminal nonpayment of income taxes by Tyms-Bey, and the trial court did not err by denying his request to assert the defense.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Vaidik, C.J., concurs.
Najam, J., dissents with a separate opinion.
Najam, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Tyms-Bey’s alleged RFRA defense may ultimately not succeed, but he is entitled to his day in court. … Moreover, in enacting Indiana’s RFRA, our legislature explicitly reserved to itself, and withheld from our judiciary, the right to declare categorical exemptions from RFRA’s application. … The majority’s analysis further misunderstands the least restrictive means test under RFRA and denies Tyms-Bey his right under Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. And the majority’s selective use of federal authority fails to consider federal cases in which religious exemptions from facially neutral tax laws have been permitted, and, in any event, the authority relied on by the majority is readily distinguishable.
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Accordingly, I would hold that Burwell, not Lee, best reflects the intent of our legislature in enacting RFRA. And this is significant here because, as Burwell explains, RFRA demands a fact-sensitive, “particularized” assessment of the claimed religious exemption, while Lee does not. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80, 2783-85.