Pyle, J.
Gary Lowrance (“Lowrance”) appeals pro se the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error regarding the denial of his motion for a nunc pro tunc order. According to Lowrance, the trial court should have granted both motions because the trial court’s statement at Lowrance’s 1996 sentencing hearing constituted an order to reinstate his right to bear arms. …
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A jury convicted Lowrance of two counts of attempted murder. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent thirty-year sentences. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id. at 376.
In December 1994, Lowrance filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court granted. Lowrance was retried and convicted of Class C felony battery and attempted voluntary manslaughter. On September 20, 1996, the trial court sentenced Lowrance to an aggregate sentence of thirty years with ten years suspended to probation. Regarding the terms and conditions of Lowrance’s probation, the trial court stated as follows:
. . . I’m not going to order that you not possess a firearm, although there was a deadly weapon involved here, there’s evidence that you did like to do hunting and I don’t see why you should be prevented from doing that, certainly you are not to illegally possess guns and that again if you did would be a violation of the State of Indiana which would be a violation of your probation. . . .
Lowrance was released from prison to probation in June 1999. Ten years later, in June 2009, he successfully completed probation. In 2014, Lowrance attempted to legally purchase a shot gun; however, his application was denied following a national background check, which revealed his attempted murder convictions.
In December 2014, Lowrance filed a “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Docket Entries to Accurately Reflect the Actions Take[n] by the Court in this Case,” wherein he asked the trial court to enter the following nunc pro tunc entries in the docket:
2. September 20, 1996, Docket Entry should include “defendant is not prohibited from possessing firearms, defendant may legally possess firearms.”
3. September 24, 1996, IDC Abstract or Abstract of Judgment should be entered reflecting convictions for less[e]r included charges of “Battery-Class C and Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter-Class A.”
The motion specifically alleged that the trial court’s statement at Lowrance’s 1996 sentencing hearing constituted an order “returning . . . Lowrance’s right to bear arms legally.” … He asked the trial court to direct the clerk or her staff to provide notice to “all appropriate State and Federal databases” that his “right to bear arms [was] legally reinstated on September 20, 1996.”
The trial court held a hearing on the petition in March 2015 and, issued an amended abstract of judgment that reflected the 1996 battery and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions in April 2015. The abstract of judgment did not address Lowrance’s argument that the trial court had issued an order reinstating his right to bear arms in 1996.
In September 2015, Lowrance filed an “Agreed Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Docket Entry to Accurately Reflect the Actions Taken by the Court in this Cause,” wherein he sought a determination that the trial court had reinstated his right to bear arms on September 20, 1996. … Two months later, in November 2015, the trial court denied Lowrance’s motion. Lowrance filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court also denied. Lowrance now appeals the denial of his motion to correct error.
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Lowrance argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a nunc pro tunc order. He specifically contends that the trial court’s statement at the 1996 sentencing hearing that it was “not going to order that [Lowrance] not possess a firearm” was, in essence, an order reinstating Lowrance’s right to bear arms. … However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing did nothing more than set forth the terms and conditions of Lowrance’s probation. The trial court was not reinstating Lowrance’s right to bear arms. Accordingly, when Lowrance’s probation ended in 2009, so did the applicability of the trial court’s 1996 sentencing statement.
Because the trial court’s sentencing statement did not constitute an order reinstating Lowrance’s substantive right to bear arms, there was no “omission in the record of action really had.” See Grayson, 851 N.E.2d at 1020. Without such an omission, there was nothing for the trial court to correct with a nunc pro tunc entry. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for nunc pro tunc order and to correct error.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.