Altice, J.
Richard Dobeski appeals following his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. Under the terms of the applicable statute, Dobeski was required to register “not more than seven (7) days after” his release from prison. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(g). On appeal, Dobeski argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction because seven days had not yet elapsed at the time he was arrested.
In 2008, Dobeski was convicted of class C felony child molesting and class D felony possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eleven years. Pursuant to Indiana law, Dobeski was required to register as a sex offender upon his release from custody.
Dobeski was released from New Castle Correctional Facility on July 16, 2015. A “Transportation Detail” form introduced into evidence at trial indicates that a transport van carrying Dobeski and seven other inmates left the prison at 9:30 a.m. … The form indicates that the van both arrived in and departed from “Indy” at 11:15 a.m., but nevertheless managed to drop off seven inmates while there. The van then travelled to Portland, Indiana, where it dropped off its last passenger at 1:30 p.m. before arriving back at the prison at 2:30 p.m. The form does not indicate which inmates were dropped off at which location. No evidence was presented concerning what further processing, if any, the inmates underwent at their destination before they were free to go.
A sergeant with the Marion County Sheriff’s Office checked the sex offender database “sometime after 1:00 in the afternoon” on July 23, 2015, and found that Dobeski had not yet registered. … At some point between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. that same day, a sheriff’s deputy located Dobeski at the Indianapolis Public Library and placed him under arrest for failure to register as a sex offender.
At trial, the State argued that seven days had elapsed between Dobeski’s release and his arrest. Specifically, the State argued that the evidence showed that Dobeski was released at 11:15 a.m. on July 16, 2015, and arrested between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. on July 23, 2015. According to the State, the “days” referred to in the statute were twenty-four-hour periods, beginning with the moment Dobeski was released from prison. In other words, Dobeski had precisely 168 hours to register. Thus, the State argued Dobeski was in violation of the statute when he failed to register by 11:15 a.m. on July 23, 2015. Dobeski, on the other hand, argued that the statute gave him seven full calendar days to register, and that he therefore had until midnight on July 23, 2015 to do so.
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Although the issue in this case is framed as whether the evidence was sufficient to support Dobeski’s conviction, that determination turns on our interpretation of a statute. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). …
I.C. § 11-8-8-7(g) provides in relevant part that “[a] sex or violent offender notcommitted to the department shall register not more than seven (7) days after the sex or violent offender . . . is released from a penal facility[.]” In this case, we are asked to determine the manner in which this time should be computed.
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We first note that T.R. 6(A) governs the computation of “any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute[.]” (emphasis supplied). …
Although there is no comparable provision in the criminal rules, Ind. Crim. Rule 21 provides that the rules of trial procedure apply in criminal proceedings “so far as they are not in conflict with any specific rule adopted by this court for the conduct of criminal proceedings.” …
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When the legislature enacted I.C. § 11-8-8-7(g), it did so against the backdrop of T.R. 6(A) and other authorities setting forth the commonly accepted method of computing time expressed in days. By declining to set forth a different computation method, the legislature evinced its intent that the “seven (7) days” referenced therein should be calculated in the usual manner. … To the extent the phrase “seven (7) days” as used in I.C. § 11-8-8-7(g) could be viewed as ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel us to resolve that ambiguity in Dobeski’s favor.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that T.R. 6(A) sets forth the proper method of computing the seven-day time frame set forth in I.C. § 11-8-8-7(g).
… When Dobeski was arrested sometime between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. on that date, “seven (7) days” had not yet elapsed for the purposes of I.C. § 11-8-8-7(g).
Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
Riley, J. and Bradford, J., concur.