Massa, J.
Mary Osborne filed this interlocutory appeal following the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, on the grounds that the traffic stop giving rise to the charges was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. …
At approximately 1:00 AM, a clerk working at a Marathon gas station in Fishers, Indiana called the police to report that a woman was “stuck underneath her vehicle in the parking lot.” … Officer Jason Arnold was participating in an OWI investigation about a mile and a half away when he received the report, and by the time he arrived, dispatch had informed him that the woman had “gotten herself out from under the vehicle and was leaving.” … As he pulled in, he saw Osborne’s black BMW pulling out from the station. He made a U-turn and followed her, but did not witness any driving infractions or criminal conduct. Nevertheless, Officer Arnold initiated a traffic stop on the basis of the dispatch report, fearing for her well-being…
After pulling her over, Officer Arnold approached Osborne’s driver’s side door and shone his flashlight into the car, where he observed no signs of physical injury. …
During this exchange, Officer Arnold detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, and observed several signs of impairment, such as her watery, red eyes, and slurred speech. … She was arrested, and at the Hamilton County jail her blood alcohol concentration tested at 0.10
Osborne was charged with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.08. Osborne moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the warrantless traffic stop was invalid under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, but certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Our Court of Appeals agreed with Osborne, finding that the police exceeded their authority under the Fourth Amendment in stopping her vehicle. Osborne v. State, 54 N.E.3d 428, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
We granted transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion below. Osborne v. State, 57 N.E.3d 816 (Ind. 2016) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
We deferentially review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, construing conflicting evidence in the manner most favorable to the ruling. Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013). … However, to the extent the motion raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).
….
Turning to the instant matter, Officer Arnold responded to a report that a woman was trapped under her car, which undoubtedly could give rise to a reasonable concern that emergency medical assistance was needed, prompting further investigation, as in both Bruce and Trotter. However, the actual facts he subsequently confronted did not objectively support that concern:
Officer Arnold learned that Osborne had freed herself prior to his arrival at the gas station, Osborne operated her vehicle normally, and Officer Arnold witnessed no traffic infractions or criminal conduct. …
We do not believe Officer Arnold’s assertion that he feared for Osborne’s medical state was merely a pretext to conduct an investigatory stop, but his subjective intent is not decisive: “[T]he test is objective, and the government must establish that the circumstances as they appear[ed] at the moment of [the stop] would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the [vehicle] required immediate assistance.” Trotter, 933 N.E.2d at 579. And in a close case on these unique facts, we err, if at all, on protecting the privacy rights of Hoosiers against intrusion by the State. Accordingly, we find that the State has failed to carry its burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment justified the stop.
Finally, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains the same text as the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, though our interpretation of that text somewhat differs: “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005) (citing Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1994)). … Accordingly, we find Officer Arnold’s conduct was also impermissible under the Indiana Constitution. …
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Osborne’s motion to suppress, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.