David, J.
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In 1997, Robert Collier pled guilty to possession of cocaine as a class D felony. He was sentenced to 545 days in the Department of Correction with 521 days suspended and 90 days of probation.
In 2001, Collier filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief … The post-conviction court appointed a public defender for Collier, but his petition for post-conviction relief was ultimately withdrawn without prejudice in 2005 …
In 2007, Collier filed a new pro se petition for post-conviction relief … Collier again indicated that he wished to have a public defender appointed and completed an affidavit of indigence. However, the court did not refer the petition to the State Public Defender and the court summarily denied Collier’s petition.
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In September 2014, Collier filed another pro se petition for post-conviction relief. … Thereafter, in April 2015, Collier, by counsel, filed both a verified motion for leave to amend his petition for post-conviction relief and a verified motion for relief from the September 2007 order (that summarily denied his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief) pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 Section 2.
In his motion for relief from judgment, Collier argued that in his 2007 petition, he requested representation and included an affidavit of indigence. As such, Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) imposed a duty upon the post-conviction court to order a copy of the petition to be sent to the State Public Defender. …
The post-conviction court granted Collier’s motion for relief from judgment before receiving a response from the State. …
The post-conviction court granted the State’s motion to reconsider. After two hearings, the post-conviction court determined that it would reinstate Collier’s 2007 petition for post-conviction relief. …
… The State appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court … We now accept transfer and affirm the post-conviction court, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. App. Rule 58(A).
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At issue here is whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in granting Collier’s Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment. …
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(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).
A motion for relief from judgment filed for reason (8) shall be filed within a reasonable time and must allege a meritorious claim or defense. … The passage of time alone is not enough to warrant the denial of a motion on the basis of timeliness. See Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1990) …
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Thus, in order to be granted relief, Collier must show that: 1) he brought his claim within a reasonable time in light of the circumstances of the case; 2) extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justify that relief; and 3) he has alleged a meritorious claim or defense. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B); Parham, 855 N.E.2d at 728; Smith, 38 N.E.3d at 221-222.
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Collier requested counsel at the time he filed his 2007 petition. However, the court never referred his petition for post-conviction relief to the State Public Defender as required by Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(2), which provides that “[i]f the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the petition sent to the Public Defender’s office. … Under these circumstances, Collier’s motion was filed in reasonable time. …
As for the requirement that Collier allege a meritorious claim or defense, in his verified motion for leave to amend his petition for post-conviction relief, Collier alleges, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to appropriately advise Collier that he would be convicted of a felony, instead of a misdemeanor, and failure of counsel to argue for alternative misdemeanor sentencing. He further argues that the trial court accepted his guilty plea even though he denied guilt at the plea hearing in contravention of Indiana law. …
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Because Collier’s petition for post-conviction relief was not referred to the State Public Defender as required by the Post-Conviction Rules, and in light of Collier’s lack of education and potential cognitive and/or mental deficiencies, the post-conviction court did not err in granting Collier’s Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment so that he could seek meaningful post-conviction review. Collier sufficiently demonstrated that he filed his motion for relief within a reasonable time considering the circumstances and that he is entitled to extraordinary relief. He also alleged a meritorious claim because, in any case, the result of his post-conviction petition will now be different than a summary dismissal. Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm its judgment.
Rush, C.J., Rucker, Massa and Slaughter, J.J., concur.