Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, Mary Price (Price), on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellees Defendants’, Indiana Department of Child Services; Director, Indiana Department of Child Services (collectively, DCS), motion for dismissal of Price’s Complaint for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6). [Footnote omitted.]
We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand.
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Price first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 only conferred a public benefit, and did not grant her a private cause of action. Although Price does not dispute the public benefits derived from the statute, she argues that the statute also awarded a private cause of action…
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…Although it is undeniable that Price and the other FCM’s will benefit from a manageable caseload, our legislature’s main consideration in enacting the statute was to protect the children and families in our society. In order to promote this public duty of protection, the legislature sought to ensure an agreeable work environment for FCMs. Therefore, as no duty for a particular individual’s benefit was imposed, no private cause of action flows from I.C. § 31-25-2-5.
In an attempt to bring the DCS into compliance with its statutory duty encapsulated in I.C.§ 31-25-2-5, Price also claims the right to bring a mandate action to compel the DCS to comply with the duty it is shirking, i.e., to maintain the prescribed staffing levels.
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Just like the public interest found to exist and confer standing in Cittadine and other case law referenced, rights created under I.C. § 31-25-2-5 are public and confer public standing on Price. The purpose of the statutorily defined maximum caseload ratios is to provide protections to the general public through consistent, efficient, and effective administration of child and family services. Accordingly—and the State does not contest—Price, as member of the general public, can avail herself of the statute through the public standing doctrine.
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…Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Price’s complaint falls within the purview of the “acts or conditions” that Indiana’s Civil Service Complaint procedure addresses. Therefore, no adequate remedy is available.
C. Clear Duty Imposed by Law
However, even though the DCS failed to formulate an explicit response to Price’s systemic deficiencies’ argument, DCS argues that mandate is inappropriate because any order by the court would entail a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and dictate the performance of discretionary agency acts. Specifically, DCS argues that in order to employ more staff to satisfy the statutory caseload standard established in I.C.§ 31-25-2-5, the legislature and Governor will have to be ordered to free up funding and to engage in specific discretionary acts. We disagree.
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Accordingly, as Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 imposes a clear, absolute, and imperative duty on DCS to comply with maximum caseload standards as determined by the legislature and no administrative remedy is available to address this systemic violation of Indiana law, we conclude that Price can proceed with a mandate action. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order to dismiss with respect to the mandate and remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that even though Price has no private case of action under I.C. § 31-25-2-5, Price’s Complaint states a claim for relief as an action for mandate.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Robb, J. concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.
Kirsch, J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Robb, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
I concur fully in Part II of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s decision that Price does not have a private right of action to enforce the statutory maximum caseload standard. As to Part III, I respectfully concur in result.
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Kirsch, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with my colleagues’ decision affirming the trial court’s judgment that the appellant does not have a private right of action. I believe, however, that the trial court was also correct in concluding that the appellant had an adequate remedy under the Indiana Civil Service Complaint procedure which she has failed to exhaust. As a result, we should not reach the issue of whether there is a public right of action under the statute.