Baker, J.
Relying on the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act and precedent from our Supreme Court, we hold that a medical malpractice plaintiff need only present the following to a medical review panel: (1) a proposed complaint that encompasses the theories of malpractice alleged in the subsequent litigation sufficiently to satisfy our notice pleading requirements; and (2) evidence relating to the theories of alleged malpractice that the plaintiff seeks to raise during the subsequent litigation. Additionally, we hold that narrative statements submitted to the panel do not subsequently bind the parties. Because these requirements were met in this case, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
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We agree with Turner and his amicus, the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA), that the plain language of the Act does not require that the submission to the MRP contain specifications of the breaches of standards of care. Furthermore, the narrative statements provided to the MRP by the attorneys do not constitute “evidence.” The MRP is only to consider “evidence” and the proposed complaint. To hold, therefore, that a medical malpractice claimant is bound by narrative and argumentative statements made by his attorneys— which the MRP need not consider in rendering its opinion, and which need not be included in the submission at all—is contrary to the plain language of the Act. Nothing in the Act prohibits these narrative statements—indeed, they are likely helpful to the MRP and opposing counsel—but nothing in the Act countenances an approach that treats these statements as evidence or as binding legal documents. See Sherrow v. Gyn, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that legal argument in MRP submissions is inappropriate because, if that were the practice, “parties’ evidentiary submissions would become lengthy legal memoranda in which the parties debate and argue points of law” and that result “would not further the legislature’s intent that [MRPs] should operate in an informal manner”).
We have concluded, based upon the language and intent of the Act, that the narrative statements commonly included among MRP submissions do not constitute evidence to be considered by the MRP. As noted above, the MRP considers “evidence” and the plaintiff’s proposed complaint in reaching an ultimate conclusion. I.C. § 34-18-10-22(a). Therefore, we must next determine what, precisely, must be included in the proposed complaint.
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It is challenging, to say the least, to synthesize K.D. with these other cases. To find our answer, we believe the best approach is to return to our Supreme Court’s last guidance on the issue, found in Miller. And Miller could not be clearer. That case instructs us to focus on the content of the proposed complaint and analyze whether, under principles of notice pleading, that complaint encompasses theories of negligence raised by the plaintiff after the MRP process has concluded. Our Supreme Court clearly and explicitly held that the plaintiff’s action is not “restricted by the substance of the submissions presented to the [MRP].” Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332. Indeed, there is no requirement whatsoever that a plaintiff “fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim” to the MRP. Id.
We believe that Miller and the Act require two things of a medical malpractice plaintiff seeking to raise new breaches of the standard of care after the MRP process has concluded. First, under the rules of notice pleading, the proposed complaint must encompass the theories regarding breach sought to be raised at trial. Second, “evidence,” as defined by the Act, related to the theories must have been submitted to the MRP. If the plaintiff has complied with both of these requirements, then evidence related to the new theories of negligence may be admitted during litigation following the MRP process. [Footnote omitted.] To the extent that K.D. has been read to require a narrative statement be submitted to the MRP, to bind parties to the content of those narrative statements, or to depart from Miller or the plain language of the Act, we believe that it was wrongly decided and/or has been misread.
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The Act requires that the MRP consider two things in reaching its conclusion on a claim of medical malpractice: (1) the proposed complaint; and (2) the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. Our Supreme Court has held that so long as, under principles of notice pleading, the proposed complaint encompasses specific allegations regarding the defendant’s alleged malpractice that were not explicitly raised to the MRP, those allegations may be raised for the first time during subsequent litigation. In other words, the plaintiff’s narrative at trial need not be identical to his MRP narrative so long as evidence relating to his theories of malpractice was before the panel.
To synthesize these two sources of authority, we hold that a plaintiff may raise any theories of alleged malpractice during litigation following the MRP process if (1) the proposed complaint encompasses the theories, and (2) the evidence related to those theories was before the MRP. In this case, those requirements were met, and Turner may therefore raise his theory related to the anticoagulant at this time.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.