Vaidik, CJ.
Charged with possession of methamphetamine and other offenses, Susan Sturdivant told the trial court—at multiple pretrial hearings over the course of fourteen months—that she wanted to waive her right to counsel and represent herself. The court allowed her to do so, and a jury convicted her on all charges. Now represented by an attorney, Sturdivant claims that she is mentally ill and that the trial court should have denied her request for self-representation under Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), which recognized the authority of trial courts to insist upon representation by counsel for those defendants who “suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”
Early one morning in August 2014, a Delphi police officer stopped Sturdivant’s pickup after Sturdivant twice failed to use a turn signal. … An officer then obtained a warrant to test Sturdivant’s blood, which revealed the presence of methamphetamine. Sturdivant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, operating while intoxicated, and operating with a controlled substance in her body.
At the initial hearing on August 25, 2014, Sturdivant and the other defendants present were advised as follows with regard to the right to counsel …
….
The next pretrial conference was held on March 26, 2015, five days before Sturdivant’s trial was to begin. … and Sturdivant agreed to the appointment of an attorney…
The court appointed an attorney, who then requested and was granted a continuance of the trial.
When the parties returned to court for a pretrial conference on June 26, 2015, Sturdivant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw from the appointment, citing a “breakdown in communication.” … When Sturdivant agreed and indicated her desire to go forward without an attorney, the court gave her the same right-to-counsel advisement it had given her at the initial hearing…
….
At a pretrial conference on September 17, 2015, …Sturdivant asserted that “you can’t use State laws to run your courtroom,” that “state laws are prohibited I believe by a couple of the amendments, of the Bill of Rights,” and that “Indiana can’t have a constitution.” … The court later asked Sturdivant if she wanted standby counsel. … Sturdivant insisted that she wanted to proceed without counsel.
The final pretrial conference was held on October 26, 2015, the day before trial.
…
… The court gave Sturdivant the same right-to-counsel advisements that it had given her previously, and Sturdivant confirmed that she understood her rights and that she still wished to proceed without counsel or standby counsel. Sturdivant then asked, “If I’m found guilty, am I going to be executed?” The court told her that she would not be and explained to her once again the charges she was facing. …
….
The jury found Sturdivant guilty on all counts. In sentencing Sturdivant, the trial court stated its belief that “there may be some undiagnosed mental illness” and found this to be a mitigating circumstance.
Sturdivant now appeals.
Sturdivant contends that the trial court should not have allowed her to represent herself, despite the fact that she had a constitutional right to do so and the fact that she explicitly and repeatedly expressed her desire to exercise that right.
…
… Sturdivant contends that the trial court should have found her to be severely mentally ill for purposes of Indiana v. Edwards based on her “bizarre statements as well as incorrect and unusual legal arguments” before and during trial, including those noted above…
While some of Sturdivant’s statements were undeniably strange, and she clearly lacked the legal skills of an experienced criminal defense attorney, this is not the stuff of “severe mental illness” under Indiana v. Edwards.
….
Sturdivant also argues that even if her odd statements and legal arguments did not demonstrate severe mental illness that rendered her incompetent to represent herself, they were sufficient to prompt a further inquiry by the trial court—especially in light of the fact that the trial court itself later expressed its belief that “there may be some undiagnosed mental illness.”
….
We agree that, under the circumstances, some further probing by the trial court would have been appropriate. See Dowell, 557 N.E.2d at 1067 … In short, Sturdivant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to inquire into her background.
We stress once again that trial courts are in the best position to assess the competency of criminal defendants and the knowingness and intelligence of waivers of the right to counsel and that we can only reverse a trial court’s determination if it was clearly erroneous. See Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d at 824; Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 503. … Sturdivant does not direct us to any facts that the trial court knew or could have discovered that would have supported a finding of severe mental illness. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to allow Sturdivant to represent herself was clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.