Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue [1] Meridian Health Services Corporation (“Meridian”) appeals the trial court’s order finding it in contempt of court for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum and appear at a deposition and awarding attorney’s fees as a sanction pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 26(C) and 37(A)(4). Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding Meridian in contempt and ordering it to pay attorney’s fees, we affirm.
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Indiana law regarding the mental health information of minors begins with the premise that records can be disclosed with the consent of the patient, Ind. Code § 16-39-2-3, and a parent is entitled to exercise the minor patient’s rights on the patient’s behalf, Ind. Code § 16-39-2-9(a)(1); 6 therefore, a parent may consent to disclosure on behalf of his or her child. Moreover, a custodial parent and a non-custodial parent have equal access to a child’s mental health records. Ind. Code § 16-39-2-9(b); see also Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § I(D)(4) (“Under Indiana law, both parents are entitled to direct access to their child’s . . . mental health records . . . .”). However, if there exists a court order that limits the noncustodial parent’s access and the health care provider has received a copy of the order or has actual knowledge of the order, then the provider must abide by the terms of the court order. Ind. Code § 16-39-2-9(b). At the outset then, state law required Meridian to disclose K.B.’s mental health information to both Father and Mother unless there was a court order limiting Father’s access. There was no such order in place at the time Father made his request for access to the records.
Not only was there no such order limiting Father’s access at that time, no such order has been requested since, by either Mother or Meridian. Rather than seeking a court order limiting Father’s access, Meridian restricted Father’s access on its own initiative and has asserted throughout this litigation that because K.B.’s therapist and physician determined that the requested information would be detrimental to K.B., Father was required to seek a court order granting him access….But Meridian also asserted that the only right parents have is to exercise the minor child’s rights on the child’s behalf and if the provider may withhold the records from the child pursuant to section 16-39-2-4, it may withhold the records from the parents, as well. Accordingly, Meridian declared it would be withholding the records from Father and Father’s only recourse was to seek a court order pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 16-39-3 when disclosure is sought absent patient consent. [Footnote omitted.]
We understand Meridian’s concern over allowing a third party access to records that may be withheld from the patient. But by its plain language, section 16-39- 2-4 restricts only the patient’s access to his or her own records….We agree with the trial court that under Indiana law, Father was entitled to direct access to K.B.’s records and was not required to seek a court order to obtain them.
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…Although we have held herein that Meridian did not have the right to withhold the records from Father under Indiana law, and the trial court found in its judgment that Meridian had not proved the requirements for withholding the records under federal law, we cannot fault Meridian for taking steps it thought necessary to preserve patient confidentiality and serve its patient’s best interest, especially considering K.B. is unable to advocate for herself, and we note the trial court did not sanction Meridian for objecting to release of the records in the first instance, either. State and federal law in this area is complex and very few cases have interpreted the relevant statutes to offer guidance; in addition, once the records have been released, they cannot be protected—so it was important for Meridian to exercise its therapeutic judgment until a court could hear and decide the matter. Had Meridian made its challenge to disclosure and then complied with the ensuing trial court decision, we might have been inclined to say a genuine issue existed as to whether it was bound to comply with Father’s request and Meridian was therefore substantially justified in initially resisting disclosure despite the ultimate determination against its position.
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Conclusion
Because HIPAA permitted and state law clearly required Meridian to release K.B.’s records to Father, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Meridian pay Father’s attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.