Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Jordache White, American Transport LLC (“American Transport”), and Canal Insurance Company (“Canal”) (collectively, “the Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s decision to deny their joint motion to set aside default judgment. The Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over White due to allegedly insufficient service of process.
2. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over American Transport due to allegedly insufficient service of process.
We affirm.
….
The Appellants first assert that Reimer’s service on White was insufficient. Specifically, the Appellants contend that the CCS entries were inconsistent and, as such, could not demonstrate that sufficient service on White had occurred. [Footnote omitted.] Further, the Appellants contend that White was never served even though Reimer received a return receipt, signed by a third party, from the address that White provided on the police report. Finally, because the Appellants contend that White was not served at that address, they further contend that service on White through the Secretary of State was not reasonably calculated to reach him there.
We reject the Appellants’ arguments. As a matter of law, White had sufficient notice of Reimer’s lawsuit. “Service delivered by United States mail, postage prepaid, as certified mail with a return receipt satisfies the method requirement of due process. . . . [A]ctual delivery to the party is not jurisdictionally necessary.” Buck v. P.J.T., 182 Ind. App. 71, 73, 394 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1979), trans. denied. There is no question that Reimer satisfied that burden here when he served White at the Thebes, Illinois, address, which White had provided to Indiana’s law enforcement following the collision, and that service was received and signed for by a party at that address, albeit someone other than White. And the Appellants do not suggest on appeal that “another method obviously better calculated to give notice [wa]s available” to Reimer. [Footnote omitted.] Anderson, 4 N.E.3d at 1206-07. Indeed, the fact that, in an abundance of caution, Reimer took the additional step of serving White through the Secretary of State is irrelevant. We hold that White had sufficient notice of the lawsuit and, as such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellants’ motion to set aside the default judgment with respect to White.
….
In other words, unlike in Munster, here the Secretary of State was, as a matter of law, American Transport’s attorney for purposes of service of process, and service on the Secretary of State was service on American Transport. I.C. § 34-33-3-1(b), (c). Thus, Reimer’s reliance on Trial Rules 4.4(B) and 4.10(A) was reasonable under the circumstances when he served American Transport’s attorney pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-33-3-1, using the business address provided by American Transport’s employee to Indiana law enforcement officers who were investigating the collision. And, unlike in Munster, here there was not “another method obviously better calculated to give notice” to American Transport than the method actually employed by Reimer.6 See Anderson, 4 N.E.3d at 1206-07.
Conclusion
In sum, we agree with the trial court that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Reimer’s service on White at his Thebes, Illinois, address and service on American Transport through the Secretary of State was reasonably calculated to inform the Appellants that an action had been instituted against them, was effective under the Indiana Trial Rules, and was consistent with due process. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the Appellants’ joint motion to set aside the default judgment.
Affirmed. Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.