Vaidik, C.J.
The Indiana Department of Child Services petitions for rehearing following our June 8, 2016 opinion in which we held that the CHINS court lost jurisdiction as soon as it discharged the parties, at which point the issue of custody reverted to the paternity court. DCS argues that the CHINS court’s custody-modification order survived the termination of the CHINS proceeding.
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There are two ways to read what “[a]n order establishing or modifying paternity of a child” means. One way is read “paternity” to mean establishing or modifying who a child’s father is. The other way is to read “paternity” like DCS suggests, that is, establishing or modifying “paternity” includes custody modifications. There are problems with both approaches.
The problem with giving “[a]n order establishing or modifying paternity of a child” its plain meaning is that it presumes that a juvenile court in a CHINS case can establish paternity. But Indiana Code section 31-14-2-1 provides that a man’s paternity may be established in only one of two ways: (1) in an action under Article 14 or (2) by executing a paternity affidavit at the hospital or local health department under Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1.2 Article 34, which governs CHINS cases, does not provide for the establishment of paternity. Indeed, Indiana Code section 31-34-15-6 provides that whenever a child born out of wedlock is alleged to be a CHINS and is under the supervision of DCS, DCS “shall refer [the] child’s case to the local prosecuting attorney’s office for the filing of a paternity action,” which, according to Section 31-14-2-1, must be filed under Article 14 (emphasis added). Thus, it does not appear that a juvenile court in a CHINS case can “establish paternity.” In addition, the phrase “modify paternity” is unclear, given that “[t]he Indiana Code has no provision for the filing of an action to disestablish paternity.” [Footnote omitted.] In re Paternity of T.H., 22 N.E.3d 804, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
The other way is to read “paternity” to include custody modifications, as the article governing the establishment of paternity also addresses determining and modifying custody. See Ind. Code ch. 31-14-13. However, Section 31-30-1-13 uses “child custody” five times and some variant of “modify” four times in subsections (a) and (b). This is evidence that the legislature uses that language, as opposed to “paternity,” when it wants to. In addition, Section 31-30-1-12, which addresses concurrent jurisdiction of marriage-dissolution and CHINS courts (as opposed to concurrent jurisdiction of paternity and CHINS courts), contains a provision nearly identical to Section 31-30-1-13(d) that uses the language “modifying child custody”…
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Given that there are problems with each reading of subsection (d), we will not guess what the legislature meant when it said “[a]n order establishing or modifying paternity of a child by a juvenile court survives the termination of the [CHINS] proceeding.” We therefore ask the legislature to take a deeper look at Sections 31-30-1-12 and -13 in light of these issues. As a result, we reach the same result as our original opinion but for different reasons by looking beyond the language of Section 31-30-1-13 and turning our attention to the policy and purpose of the CHINS statutory scheme.
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It is clear that the policy and purpose of the CHINS statutory scheme is not to remove children from their parents without giving the parents a reasonable opportunity to participate. But this goal was not furthered in this case. That is, DCS used the coercive power of the State to insert itself into a family relationship by obtaining a CHINS finding and then had the CHINS court modify sole custody to Father and close the CHINS case thirty days later— without entering a dispositional decree and giving Mother a meaningful opportunity to participate in services that DCS itself had recommended in both the petition for parental participation and the predispositional report. This is particularly troublesome given that a CHINS adjudication has adverse consequences for parents. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (providing that two separate CHINS adjudications can be the basis for a petition to terminate parental rights). We therefore reverse that part of the CHINS court’s order that discharged the parties and terminated the CHINS case and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the CHINS statutes, including any appropriate services for Mother.
Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.