Robb, J.
Following a trifurcated jury trial, Christopher Compton was convicted of three counts of felony murder and found to be an habitual offender. Compton appeals, raising two restated issues: (1) whether Compton was deprived of due process when the trial court allowed the media to Tweet live updates of his trial from the courtroom, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Compton’s incriminatory statements. …
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Prior to trial, the trial court instructed the jury not to use the internet to gather information about the case and not to read, watch, or listen to any source discussing the trial, including newspapers, radio, television, and the internet. During trial, but outside the presence of the jury, a reporter approached the trial court and asked whether the media could give live updates of the trial via the social media application, Twitter. Compton objected and the trial court overruled his objection, noting,
I’m going to—I am going to instruct the parties to tell their witnesses to turn off their Twitter accounts until after they’ve testified. . . . But I am going to allow those of you in the media that are here that are Tweeting, I think that’s what it’s called, you’re going to be permitted to do that so long as it’s done in a way that doesn’t interfere with the proceedings.
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Compton contends the trial court violated Rule 2.17 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in allowing the media to Tweet live updates of his trial from the courtroom, arguing Tweeting live updates of his criminal trial amounts to inherently prejudicial “broadcasting” that violates his right to due process. The State counters Tweeting does not amount to broadcasting, and even if so, Compton has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice. Because broadcasting a defendant’s trial is not inherently prejudicial and Compton has not demonstrated he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged broadcasting, we need not address whether Tweeting live updates of a criminal trial is deemed “broadcasting.”
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As noted above, it is unnecessary to decide whether Twitter is “broadcasting,” because even assuming it is, broadcasting is not inherently prejudicial and Compton has shown no specific prejudice to him in this case. … We conclude Compton was not deprived of due process when the media was allowed to Tweet live updates of his criminal trial from the courtroom.
Compton cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged broadcasting of his criminal trial and we therefore conclude Compton was not deprived of due process. …
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.