May, J.
The State appeals the grant of Wallace Irvin Smith, III’s petition for alternative misdemeanor sentencing. The State presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
1. Whether the trial court had authority to modify Smith’s sentence under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014); and
2. Whether the language of Smith’s plea agreement precluded the trial court from modifying his conviction of Class D felony theft to a Class A misdemeanor.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) permits the trial court to modify Smith’s sentence and the language of Smith’s plea agreement did not preclude it. We affirm.
On July 18, 2000, Smith agreed to plead guilty to Class D felony theft. His plea agreement provided, among other things, that Smith would be “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause[.]” … On October 31, 2000, the trial court accepted the agreement, entered a conviction of Class D felony theft, and sentenced Smith to one-year probation. The court discharged Smith from probation on June 13, 2002.
On May 26, 2015, Smith asked the trial court to convert his conviction of Class D felony theft to a Class A misdemeanor under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014). Over the State’s objection, the trial court granted Smith’s petition, vacated his conviction of Class D felony theft, and entered the conviction as a Class A misdemeanor. ….
… Because the legislature intended Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) to apply retroactively, the trial court had authority to modify Smith’s sentence.
Smith’s plea agreement provided: “As a part of this plea agreement [Smith] agrees that he will be precluded from asking for Misdemeanor [sic] treatment in this cause[.]” (Appellant’s App. at 8.) The State argues the clause waives Smith’s right to seek a sentence modification under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) because the terms of the plea agreement are binding. As the language of the plea agreement forecloses only those remedies known at the time the agreement was entered, the terms of the plea agreement did not preclude Smith’s sentence modification under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) because that section did not exist when the agreement was made.
….
In 2000, when Smith entered his plea agreement, the legislature had “not granted the trial court the authority to modify the conviction at any time other than while delivering the sentence.” Brunner, 947 N.E.2d at 416. Thus, the only “Misdemeanor treatment” available at the time of Smith’s plea agreement was to change his Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor during sentencing.
As a trial court could not have changed a Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor after sentencing at the time the plea agreement was entered, the parties could not have contemplated the term “Misdemeanor treatment” could mean conversion after the original sentencing. … Therefore, Smith’s plea agreement did not preclude converting his felony conviction to a misdemeanor at the time he petitioned the trial court.
The trial court had authority under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) to convert Smith’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor because the legislature intended such conversion could be done after sentencing. The terms of Smith’s plea agreement do not preclude the conversion because conversion after sentencing could not have been contemplated by the parties when they entered the agreement. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.