Barnes, J.
Harold Chastain appeals his conviction for Class C felony intimidation. We affirm.
The sole issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Chastain’s conviction for Class C felony intimidation.
The evidence most favorable to the conviction is that, on the evening of March 8, 2013, Justin Beegle was waiting for a table with his family at the Between the Buns restaurant in Elkhart. Beegle heard Chastain loudly arguing with a woman, Tracy Wilmore, in the parking lot, and, after he saw Chastain shove her, Beegle decided to intervene. … Chastain then turned around, went to his truck, retrieved a handgun, cocked and pointed it at Beegle, and then said “I’ll f***ing kill you” several times. Id. Beegle responded by telling Chastain he was a “f***ing p***y.” Id. at 265. The encounter ended shortly thereafter when Chastain got in his truck and drove away.
The State charged Chastain with Class C felony intimidation, Class D felony pointing a firearm, and Class B misdemeanor battery. … The trial court entered judgments of conviction for all three counts but later merged the pointing a firearm conviction into the intimidation conviction at sentencing. Chastain now appeals.
Chastain contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Class C felony intimidation. In conducting such a review, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). …We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id.
In order to convict Chastain of intimidation as charged, the State was required to prove that he communicated a threat to another person, with the intent that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (2013). The offense was a Class C felony if the defendant drew or used a deadly weapon while communicating that threat. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2) (2013). Here, the sole point of contention is whether the State adequately proved that Chastain intended to place Beegle in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act when he pointed a firearm at and threatened to kill Beegle.
….
… Here, Beegle committed a distinct lawful act by interrupting Chastain’s argument and fight with Wilmore. Chastain then directed his anger toward Beegle. It is clear from the evidence that Chastain reacted in response to Beegle’s interruption. …
We acknowledge that Chastain did not explicitly tell Beegle why he pointed a gun at Beegle and repeatedly said that he was going to kill Beegle. Still, we conclude it was reasonable to infer from the evidence that Chastain’s actions were prompted by the initial lawful act of Beegle interrupting his argument with Wilmore, and Chastain’s threat was communicated with the intent to place Beegle in fear for that act. There is nothing in the intimidation statute that requires a defendant to expressly state what the victim’s prior lawful act was for which a defendant intends to retaliate. …
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, we believe that persons in a position like that in which Beegle found himself should be able to attempt to defuse situations like the one between Chastain and Wilmore without being threatened with the use of deadly force for doing so. … There is no requirement in the intimidation statute that the prior lawful act has to be completed for any considerable length of time before a threat is made.
… Here, it is clear that Beegle engaged in a prior lawful act, and there was a clear nexus between that act and Chastain’s threat to kill Beegle while pointing a gun at him. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Chastain committed the crime of intimidation while drawing or using a deadly weapon.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.