Robb, J.
Lisa Harris appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained from a consent search during a seat belt enforcement stop. Concluding the officer lacked an independent basis of reasonable suspicion justifying inquiry above and beyond the seat belt violation, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
On November 25, 2014, Indiana State Police Trooper Mike Organ was parked outside a gas station in Clinton, Indiana, when he observed the driver and passenger of a passing vehicle were not wearing seat belts. Trooper Organ pulled out of the parking lot, and the vehicle abruptly turned onto an adjacent street. Trooper Organ followed the vehicle, activated his emergency lights, and initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Organ approached the driver’s side and first asked the driver for identification. The driver produced her driver’s license, which indicated her name was Lisa Harris. Trooper Organ immediately recognized her name as appearing on National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) reports “in the past.” …
Trooper Organ returned to his police vehicle to check Harris’s driving status, determine whether she had any outstanding warrants, and confirm Harris’s name appeared on NPLEx. Harris had a valid driver’s license and did not have any outstanding warrants, but NPLEx indicated Harris had purchased pseudoephedrine nine times in the past year. Her most recent purchase occurred four days prior to the traffic stop. With this information, Trooper Organ returned to Harris and asked her to speak with him in his police vehicle. Harris agreed. When Trooper Organ asked Harris if she purchased cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine on November 21, 2014, Harris admitted she had, “for her nose.” …
Trooper Organ obtained Harris’s consent to search her vehicle and its contents. Inside Harris’s purse, he discovered a baggie of white powder that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Harris claimed she forgot about the methamphetamine and admitted she regularly smokes methamphetamine. Trooper Organ cited both Harris and her passenger for failure to wear a seat belt but arrested only Harris. The State charged Harris with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony. Harris filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. …
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Harris contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Trooper Organ’s investigation above and beyond the seat belt violation contravened Indiana’s Seatbelt Enforcement Act (“Act”). We agree. Although a vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with the Act, “a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of [the Act].” Ind. Code § 9-19-10-3.1(a) (emphasis added). “[T]he Act simply does not permit investigatory behavior based solely on a seat belt violation unless circumstances arise after the stop that independently provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Ind. 2010).
By contrast, in State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the defendant failed to produce his driver’s license during a seat belt enforcement stop, which prompted the officer to run a license check. The license check revealed Morris’s driving privileges had been suspended, and the officer asked Morris to step out of his vehicle. As Morris did so, the officer detected an odor of alcohol on his breath. Morris admitted he had been drinking and agreed to submit to a chemical breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.10 grams. The State charged Morris with driving while suspended and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Morris filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence was obtained in violation of the Act. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and we reversed, holding (1) the officer was justified in requesting Morris’s license because it was reasonably necessary to issue a citation for failure to wear a seat belt, and (2) that Morris’s failure to produce his driver’s license was a circumstance independent of the initial seat belt violation: …
We conclude the facts of the present case are more akin to that in Richardson because Trooper Organ’s only basis for additional questioning was his recollection of Harris’s name appearing on NPLEx. NPLEx is a database used by retailers and law enforcement to track and regulate sales of over-the-counter medications containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. …
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We similarly conclude Trooper Organ’s questioning after he requested Harris’s driver’s license was an attempt to “fish” for evidence of other crimes… ….
… Trooper Organ’s recollection of Harris’s name appearing on NPLEx did not provide an independent basis of reasonable suspicion that would justify further investigation. …
Trooper Organ lacked an independent basis of reasonable suspicion that would justify further inquiry during a seat belt enforcement stop. Because his questioning violated the Act, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Harris’s motion to suppress, and we remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., concurs.
Najam, J., dissents with opinion.
Najam, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Trooper Organ violated Indiana’s Seatbelt Enforcement Act when he investigated Harris for her frequent purchases of products containing pseudoephedrine. The majority’s opinion does not take into account numerous facts relied on by the trial court in its denial of Harris’ motion to suppress. Trooper Organ recognized Harris from the frequency with which her name appeared on the NPLEx, and our precedent expressly permits an officer in a seatbelt stop to take reasonable steps to investigate a driver based on the officer’s actual knowledge of the driver’s identity. The majority declares that the NPLEx is of no probative value to criminal investigations unless it demonstrates on its face illegal pseudoephedrine purchases or attempted purchases. I cannot wholly agree.
The entire point of the database of pseudoephedrine purchases is to prevent the use of commercially available products in the manufacture of methamphetamine. … ….
Considering the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the trial court’s judgment is supported by sufficient evidence. Trooper Organ’s post-stop investigation of Harris was not based solely on a seatbelt violation but, instead, on numerous facts and circumstances that arose after he had initiated the stop, which independently provided Trooper Organ with reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal conduct. …
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Nothing about the circumstances of Trooper Organ’s investigation demonstrates that he used the seatbelt violation merely to go on a fishing expedition. To the contrary, Trooper Organ’s investigation was simply good police work. … Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Harris’ motion to suppress.