Bailey, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s grant of Megan Cassady’s motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop and dog sniff. The State raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting Cassady’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 19, 2015, DeKalb County Sheriff’s Deputy Todd McCormick observed Cassady stop at an intersection and then turn right without allowing any distance between her approach to the intersection and the activation of her turn signal. Deputy McCormick initiated a traffic stop, and called dispatch with the location, the vehicle description, and the license plate information. …
He then returned to his vehicle, hooked up his dog “on lead,” and requested a license check on Cassady. Id. at 13. … Approximately four minutes passed between the time Cassady stopped her vehicle and the completion of the dog sniff. Deputy McCormick then searched the vehicle and discovered drugs under the driver’s seat.
On April 21, 2015, the State charged Cassady with possession of methamphetamine as a level 6 felony, possession of paraphernalia as a class A misdemeanor, and failure to signal turn as a class C infraction. On September 17, 2015, Cassady filed a motion to suppress and argued that the search of her vehicle was in violation of the United States and Indiana Constitutions.
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On November 5, 2015, the court entered an order granting Cassady’s motion to suppress, which states:
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Both sides have cited the recent U.S. Supreme Court case Rodriguez v. U.S. for the proposition that [sic], “that a dog search cannot extend a traffic stop unless there is reasonable suspicion for a further, non-traffic investigation” as phrased in the argument section of the State’s brief.
Under the facts of this case, there was no reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity for a further non-traffic investigation. The State argues that the stop in this case was around three and a half minutes, not twenty-nine minutes as in Rodriguez, but neither the total amount of time of the stop nor the sequence of whether the drug dog hit before or after dispatch completed the check of [Cassady’s] license are determinative.
As such, the items discovered and seized from [Cassady’s] vehicle were taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and will be suppressed.
Appellant’s Appendix at 34-35.
Discussion
The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Cassady’s motion to suppress. …
The State’s position is that the trial court clearly erred as a matter of law in suppressing the evidence on the basis that there was no reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity for a further non-traffic investigation, and that Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), and the long line of Indiana dog sniff cases require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity only when the dog sniff occurs after the traffic stop has been, or reasonably should have been, completed. …
Cassady does not challenge the initial traffic stop or allege that the automobile exception did not apply. Rather, she argues that the dog sniff occurred after Deputy McCormick should have completed the tasks relating to the traffic stop, thus prolonging the stop. …
The State responds that Cassady’s assertion “ignores the reality that until the officer receives the report back he will often not have decided whether to issue a ticket or just a warning.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6. … ….
To the extent the trial court based its grant of Cassady’s motion to suppress merely on the idea that no reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed, we disagree. “It is well settled that a dog sniff is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010).
… We also note that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)), trans. denied.
In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed dog sniffs in the context of traffic stops. The Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” 135 S. Ct. at 1612. … ….
The trial court made no finding regarding whether conducting the dog sniff prolonged the stop. …
… Under the circumstances, we conclude that Deputy McCormick’s actions were conducted in a manner that did not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket. … Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Cassady’s motion to suppress.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Cassady’s motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., concurs.
May, J., dissents with separate opinion.
May, Judge, dissenting.
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I believe the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence because the officer prolonged the traffic stop to complete the dog sniff and did not have reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the stop. I acknowledge other decisions involve stops that were prolonged more. But under Rodriguez, the amount of time by which the stop is prolonged is not determinative. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (“The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’ – i.e., adds time to – ‘the stop[.]’”).
As the officer prolonged the stop without reasonable suspicion, I respectfully dissent.