Brown, J.
Rachel Staggs appeals the trial court’s order awarding treble damages, actual costs, and attorney fees pursuant to the Crime Victim Relief Act (“CVRA”) in favor of Corena Buxbaum. Staggs raises two issues which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court applied the wrong standard in awarding exemplary damages under the CVRA; and
II. Whether the court’s award of exemplary damages is clearly erroneous.
We affirm.
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…Indeed, although Staggs’s brief repeatedly attempts to cast CVRA damages as “punitive” and suggests that the holding of Wysocki brings the CVRA under the ambit of the Punitive Damages Act, we observe that Ind. Code § 34-24-3-3 provides that a person may not recover both punitive damages and damages under the CVRA, which provides further support for the conclusion that CVRA damages are distinct from common law punitive damages. [Footnote omitted.] We conclude that the court’s application of a preponderance of the evidence standard was not clearly erroneous.
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Thus, the Court in Wysocki held that, where the complaint is sufficiently open ended to encompass alternative theories of liability, including common law fraudulent misrepresentation sounding in tort and quasi-criminal CVRA liability, the court has discretion to award compensatory tort damages only or damages under the CVRA….
In this case, Staggs does not challenge the court’s decision to impose CVRA liability at all – she is not disputing the award of costs and attorney fees totaling $7,040.00. Rather, her argument is that the court did not make the findings that her actions were sufficiently heinous to award exemplary damages under the CVRA. In its September Order, the court acknowledged that certain “conflicting evidence is relevant to the Court’s determination of whether the record shows ‘criminally culpable’ or ‘heinous’ conduct” regarding Staggs’s representations regarding the septic system, and it made a similar observation regarding Staggs’s representations concerning the basement moisture issues. Appellant’s Appendix at 17. Having so acknowledged, the court went on to find unequivocally that Staggs “had actual knowledge of the defects in her home and the failure to disclose those defects were heinous acts,” noting that such misrepresentations “could have impaired the health of the future occupants and significantly affected the expected normal life of the premises.” Id. at 24. The court also found that Staggs “lied for financial gain putting her welfare ahead of the safety and welfare of the future occupants.” Id. It concluded that such facts show that Staggs “did act in a ‘heinous’ and ‘criminally culpable’ manner when she completed her sales disclosure form,” and accordingly it ordered that she pay treble damages, costs, and attorney fees to Buxbaum pursuant to the CVRA.
The court in its September Order made an “assessment of criminality” as instructed by this court in Staggs I, and it concluded that Staggs acted in a heinous and criminally culpable manner sufficient to warrant exemplary damages…
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s September Order.
Affirmed. Baker, J., and May, J., concur.