Bailey, J.
Case Summary
Timothy Jimerson (“Jimerson”) appeals his conviction for Voluntary Manslaughter, a Class A felony. He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the testimony of an expert witness. We affirm.
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Discussion and Decision
Prior to trial, Jimerson filed a motion to suppress his police statement, arguing that it was a product of psychological coercion. The suppression motion was denied, and Jimerson notified the State that he intended to present an expert witness on false confessions. …
At trial, Jimerson presented the testimony of Dr. Richard Leo (“Dr. Leo”), a law professor and expert in the field of false confessions. Dr. Leo opined that the “Reid method” of interrogation is widely used but “might be too effective” in some cases. (Tr. at 1048) …
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After Dr. Leo provided this background, defense counsel confirmed that Dr. Leo had watched the videotape of Jimerson’s statement. Defense counsel then ventured: “And there was a point where,” prompting an objection from the prosecutor. (Tr. at 1064.) The jury was excused and the parties presented argument as to the breadth of false confession testimony in light of three cases under consideration by the trial court: Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ind. 2002); and Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The trial court ruled that Dr. Leo could testify “about the phenomena of false confessions” and about “problematic practices” but the jury was to determine whether a particular technique had been applied in Jimerson’s case. …
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On appeal, Jimerson contends that the trial court too narrowly construed Callis, Miller, and Shelby and abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Leo’s testimony addressing the particular circumstances surrounding Jimerson’s confession. …
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In Callis, Dr. Richard Ofshe (“Dr. Ofshe”) was allowed to testify about the phenomena of false or coerced confessions but was not permitted to comment that there were three different versions of an inculpatory statement or to offer opinion testimony such as “someone is telling the truth and someone is lying.” Callis, 684 N.E.2d at 239. On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded: “the trial court properly admitted Ofshe’s testimony regarding the phenomenon of coerced confessions and properly excluded his opinion about Callis’s interrogation.” Id. Citing Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), the Court further observed that no witness is competent to testify that another witness is or is not telling the truth. Id. at 239-40.
In Miller, Dr. Ofshe was called as a defense expert witness but was not permitted to testify before the jury. … Our Indiana Supreme Court held that the erroneous exclusion of the whole of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony affected the substantial rights of the defendant and granted a new trial. Id. at 774.
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In Shelby, a panel of this Court again addressed the proper parameters of testimony from an expert on false or coerced confessions. Dr. Leo had been permitted to testify at some length regarding false confessions and the methods police use during interrogation. 986 N.E.2d at 368. He also testified about what he considered problems with the Reid method used by police who interrogated Shelby; however, the trial court sustained the State’s objection when Shelby’s counsel asked Dr. Leo if he thought that the tactics used by the police when interrogating Shelby were coercive. Id. ….
The Shelby Court reviewed the Callis and Miller decisions, then wrote:
We understand the Miller court’s general approval of Callis to mean that experts may testify on the general subjects of coercive police interrogation and false or coerced confessions. Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 773. … Experts may not, however, comment about the specific interrogation in controversy in a way that may be interpreted by the jury as the expert’s opinion that the confession in that particular case was coerced or false, as this would invade the province of the jury and violate Evidence Rule 704(b).
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Jimerson argues that Shelby can be read to “suggest” that Miller provides for admissibility of expert testimony on “techniques used in the particular interrogation.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. …
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Together with extensive background testimony from Dr. Leo, the jury was provided with Jimerson’s statement in audio, video, and written form. Moreover, Jimerson testified and explained his subjective view, that is, he had said certain things he later recanted because he was “very scared.” (Tr. at 1163.) He testified that he had been led into scenarios, told that his DNA was all over Spicer’s body and house, and encouraged to demonstrate that he was not a monster. As such, the jury had been given adequate information to apply its common knowledge and experience. Where a jury is able to apply concepts without further assistance, highlighting individual exchanges or vouching for the truth or falsity of particular evidence is invasive.
Conclusion
Jimerson has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in the restriction of expert testimony.
Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.