Baker, J.
Traci Leach died from lung cancer after a radiologist failed to diagnose a tumor on a CT scan. After Leach’s death, multiple medical malpractice claims were filed, including a claim filed by three of her young children. The trial court dismissed all of the claims except for the children’s because the claims were untimely filed. But it found that because the children were under the age of six at the time of the alleged negligence and under the age of eight at the time of the filing of the complaint, their claims were not time-barred. Given the plain language of the statutes at issue, we find that the trial court did not err by finding that the children’s claims were not time-barred.
Anonymous M.D. (the Doctor) and Anonymous Hospital (the Hospital) (collectively, the Appellants) bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order partially denying their summary judgment motion. The Appellants argue that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the claims of Traci’s children and that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment on those claims. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
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As noted above, the relevant MMA statute provides that “[a] claim” sounding in medical malpractice must be filed within two years of the alleged negligence, “except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until the minor’s eighth birthday to file.” I.C. § 34-18-7-1(b). The central question presented by this case—whether the minor included in this statute must be the party injured by the alleged negligence or, instead, may be a non-injured party bringing a derivative claim—is an issue of first impression.
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….The plain language of this statute includes derivative claimants as “patients,” and includes the claims of children as derivative claims. Our legislature could have drafted the definition of patients to exclude derivative claimants, but it elected not to do so. We are bound by the language it selected, which clearly includes derivative claimants as patients.
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…Given that our legislature has decided to treat children under the age of eight in a special way for the purpose of the medical malpractice limitations period and has not limited the special treatment to direct claimants, we find that the tolling provision must apply whether the children are derivative or direct claimants. Consequently, the trial court did not err by determining that the Children in this case were not time-barred because of the two-year statute of limitations period governing the underlying claim from which their claim derives.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.