Baker, J.
P.P. (Biological Mother) appeals the judgment of the trial court, which granted an adoption petition over her objection. In an attempt to hasten the adoption process, the trial court dispensed with the statutorily required criminal background check, and did not consolidate a pending paternity action with the adoption proceeding. Reminded of the maxim, “Wisely and slow; they stumble that run fast,” we reverse and remand with instructions to correct these errors. [Footnote omitted.]
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Biological Mother argues that Adoptive Mother and the adoption court failed to comply with the statutory supervision requirements. Indiana Code section 31- 19-8-1 says that “[a]n adoption may be granted in Indiana only after . . . except as provided in section 2(c) of this chapter, a period of supervision . . . by a licensed child placing agency for a child who has not been adjudicated to be a child in need of services.” All parties agree that no such supervision took place, but Adoptive Mother argues that she took advantage of the exception in section 2(c). That exception applies “if one (1) of the petitioners is a stepparent . . . of the child and the court waives the report under section 5(c) of this chapter.” I.C. § 31-19-8-2(c).
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We must pause our analysis to note a glaring deficiency in the instant case: we can find no mention in the record of any involvement of any licensed child placing agency or any Department of Child Services (DCS) office. Our General Assembly has required that every adoption case—whether done by stepparent, blood relative, or a nonrelative—involve either a licensed child placing agency or DCS. In general, every petitioner must have such an agency complete the period of supervision along with a report. I.C. § 31-19-8-1. Although the supervisory period and report can be waived for stepparents or grandparents, I.C. § 31-19-8-5(c), exercising that waiver then obligates the court to order an agency to conduct a criminal history check and complete a report. I.C. § 31-19- 8-5(d). In sum, the absence of any child placing agency or DCS in this case means an error has occurred.
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We cannot find any statutory sanction for the proposition that one can waive all involvement of child placing agencies or DCS by providing the court with a self-produced report. This instruction from the adoption court was erroneous. The question becomes whether the error is reversible error.
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What is more, our General Assembly has specifically legislated that “[a] court may not waive any criminal history check requirements set forth in this chapter.” I.C. § 31-19-2-7.3. The requirement to get a 22.5 check comes from that same chapter. I.C. § 31-19-2-7.5. Given that our General Assembly has explicitly instructed that no part of a 22.5 check can be waived, and that the adoption court here has apparently waived all of the national components of the 22.5 check, we cannot say that the deficiencies in the criminal background check were harmless in this case.
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Our General Assembly was aware that we strictly construe the adoption statutes, and still took the time to reiterate that the 22.5 check cannot be waived. I.C. § 31-19-2-7.3. It follows that a criminal background check that complies with Indiana Code section 31-9-2-22.5 is an essential particular of the adoption process; its absence renders an adoption petition fatally deficient.
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…We have previously held that a trial court that once possessed jurisdiction over a paternity case loses that jurisdiction when an adoption petition is filed in another trial court. In re B.C., 9 N.E.3d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). There is no case addressing the question before us, namely, whether the adoption court, having acquired exclusive jurisdiction, is required to consolidate the paternity case before ruling on the adoption petition.
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…We do find, however, that the paternity action should have been consolidated with the adoption proceeding before the adoption court issued its decision.
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Moreover, the paternity action needs to be consolidated with the adoption proceeding because a successful adoption petition severs the parental rights and obligations of the biological parents. Ind. Code § 31-19-15-1. Thus, upon the grant of an adoption petition, the paternity action should close. But upon the filing of the adoption petition, the paternity court loses jurisdiction to rule on the paternity case. In re B.C., 9 N.E.3d at 754. And if the adoption court issues its ruling, the adoption case closes and the adoption court can no longer rule on the paternity case. Thus, a paternity action that should be closed will instead exist in limbo with no court able to close it.
Instead, the adoption court should consolidate the paternity action before issuing its adoption decree. This way, the adoption court will be able to close the paternity action if it grants the adoption petition. In addition, many issues present in the paternity action will also have a bearing on the adoption analysis, and so an early consolidation will aid the adoption court’s decision.
The decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to consolidate the paternity action and to order a statutorily compliant background check.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.