Bradford, J.
Case Summary
In February of 2014, the Indiana Supreme Court suspended Appellant-Defendant Joseph Lehman from practicing law in the state of Indiana for not less than two years. In the year following his suspension, Lehman continued to provide various legal services to new and existing clients. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) subsequently charged Lehman with three counts of Class B misdemeanor practicing law by a non-attorney. After a bench trial, Lehman was found guilty as charged. Lehman raises three contentions for our review on appeal: …and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
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To prove that Lehman was guilty of practicing law by a non-attorney, the State was required to show that Lehman (1) professed to be a practicing attorney, (2) conducted the trial of a case in a court in Indiana, or (3) engaged in the business of a practicing lawyer, without being admitted as an attorney by the Indiana Supreme Court. Ind. Code § 33-43-2-1. Lehman concedes that he was not permitted to practice law after his suspension date of April 3, 2014. However, he argues that the evidence is insufficient because he only provided “general legal information” to Lacan and Alvarez, and did not speak to Marlow after his suspension date.
“The practice of law includes ‘the doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages…[b]ut in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel….’” Matter of Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Fink v. Peden, 214 Ind. 584, 585, 17 N.E.2d 95, 96 (1938)). “The core element of practicing law is the giving of legal advice to a client and placing oneself in the very sensitive relationship wherein the confidence of the client, and the management of his affairs, is left totally in the hands of the attorney.” Id. “The practice of law involves advising or rendering services for another.” Dumes v. State, 23 N.E.3d 798, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Additionally, Indiana courts have repeatedly held that drafting or preparing legal instruments is generally considered practicing law. …
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A. Marlow
Several emails were admitted into evidence which reveal that Lehman continued to negotiate a settlement agreement with counsel for Marlow’s wife in the weeks following his suspension. Such activity certainly qualifies as “engag[ing] in the business of a practicing lawyer” as contemplated by Section 33-43-2-1. See Diaz, 838 N.E.2d at 448 (“The practice of law includes making it one’s business to act for others in legal formalities, negotiations, or proceedings.”). …
B. Alvarez
Approximately six months after Lehman was suspended from practicing law, Lehman conducted an initial consultation with Alvarez, accepted an $80 consultation fee, and gave Alvarez a receipt for the fee written on the back of his business card. The front of the business card read “Joseph C. Lehman, Attorney at Law.” Ex. 5. Although Lehman told Alvarez that he could not appear in court, he never informed her that he was suspended and offered to complete the paperwork necessary for her case for $1000.
We find that Lehman’s use of business cards which suggested that he was still a licensed attorney, and his failure to correct Alvarez’s misperception that he was an attorney, are sufficient facts to show that Lehman professed to be a practicing attorney for purposes of Section 33-43-2-1. Furthermore, as we noted above, providing legal advice and preparing legal documents constitutes the practice of law. Therefore, engaging in legal consultation with Alvarez, accepting a consultation fee, and offering to complete the paperwork necessary to seek a divorce are facts sufficient to establish that Lehman was “engag[ing] in the business of a practicing lawyer.” Ind. Code § 33-43-2-1.
C. Lacan
In November of 2014, approximately seven months after his suspension, Lehman prepared a quitclaim deed for Lacan for $50. The deed and a receipt for the work were admitted as exhibits at trial. Lehman had represented Lacan in a divorce ten years earlier and Lacan hired Lehman believing that he was still a licensed attorney. The Indiana Supreme Court has previously held that preparation of a deed by non-lawyers is considered unauthorized practice of law. Ind. Real Estate Ass’n, 244 Ind. at 225, 191 N.E.2d at 717. Accordingly, Lehman’s preparation of the quitclaim deed for Lacan constituted unauthorized practice of law.
Conclusion
We conclude that (1) the trial court did not clearly error in finding that Lehman failed to establish historical facts which support a rational inference of bias necessary to justify a change of judge; (2) Lehman waived his right to a jury trial; and (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Lehman’s convictions.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J. and Altice, J. concur.