Baker, J.
… Sidener argues that law enforcement’s use of a GPS tracking device to track the movements of a vehicle in which he was a passenger violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We find that Sidener may not challenge the constitutionality of the search, as he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. …
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I. Constitutionality of the GPS Search
Both the United States and Indiana constitutions protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by agents of the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. The United States Supreme Court has held that the government’s installation of a GPS device on a vehicle, and its subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012). While the search at issue here was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, the officers’ actions may nevertheless be found unconstitutional if they exceeded the scope of the warrant. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990); Conn v. State, 496 N.E.2d 604, 607-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Sidener argues that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant in this case, as he believes that the warrant did not authorize the officers to continue to monitor Green’s vehicle outside of Vanderburgh County.
However, the trial court found that Sidener was merely a passenger—he was not the vehicle’s owner, nor did he exercise control over the vehicle—and, therefore, he could not challenge the propriety of the search. Tr. p. 23-25. Accordingly, the trial court denied Sidener’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the GPS monitoring and allowed that evidence to be introduced at trial. Decisions regarding the admission of evidence are within the trial court’s discretion and we review such decisions deferentially. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). However, because the trial court’s decision in this case concerns the constitutionality of a search, it presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
We agree with the trial court. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a defendant may not challenge the constitutionality of a search unless he can demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153-55 (1978). As Sidener was only a passenger in the vehicle, he seems to acknowledge that he cannot challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment…
Instead, Sidener relies on the Indiana Constitution, which he believes provides broader protection in this case. He points out the analysis under our State’s constitution focuses not only on the defendant’s interest in the premises searched, but also on his possessory interests in any property seized. Bradley v. State, 4 N.E.3d 831, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
At this point, however, Sidener’s argument becomes strained. He attempts to distinguish the initial placement of the GPS device, which he apparently characterizes as a search of the premises, from the subsequent tracking of the GPS device, which he attempts to characterize as a seizure of property. …
… The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the “installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 (emphasis added). … The entire purpose of placing a GPS device on a vehicle is to obtain information about that vehicle’s subsequent movements, and it therefore makes sense that it is the placement of the device and the subsequent tracking of that device that constitute the “search.” Id.
Furthermore, even assuming that information regarding the whereabouts of Green’s vehicle could be construed as “property” that had been “seized,” Sidener has failed to show an interest in it. … However, Sidener’s case does not raise these concerns because the government had no interest in Sidener’s movements, nor did it seek to invade his privacy. In fact, the officers did not even know that Sidener was a passenger until they stopped the vehicle. Accordingly, Sidener has not shown that his personal interests were affected by the GPS monitoring of Green’s vehicle and, therefore, he cannot challenge the search of the vehicle under the U.S. or Indiana constitution.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.