Sharpnack, S.J.
Michael Pugh appeals his convictions of two counts of rape, both Class A felonies; one count of attempted criminal deviate conduct, a Class A felony; one count of robbery, a Class B felony; three counts of carjacking, all Class B felonies; one count of robbery, a Class A felony; one count of robbery, a Class C felony; and one count of burglary, a Class A felony. We affirm.
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Next Pugh argues that his three robbery convictions violate the single larceny rule such that two of his convictions must be vacated. The single larceny rule has historically provided that “when several articles of property are taken at the same time, from the same place, belonging to the same person or to several persons there is but a single ‘larceny’, i.e. a single offense.” Raines v. State, 514 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ind. 1987). …
The State charged Pugh with three counts of robbery, with each count alleging a different victim.
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Pugh claims that the items were all taken pursuant to a single intent and were all part of the same criminal transaction. He also asserts that it makes no difference that the items belonged to three different individuals.
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… Thus, the single larceny rule does not apply here where the robbery of the husband, the robbery of the wife, and the robbery of the daughter were distinct transactions, some of which occurred at neither the same place nor the same time. See Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 944-45 (no violation of single larceny rule where defendant convicted of one count of theft for taking victim’s money, credit card, and car keys from motel room and second count of theft for taking victim’s car from motel parking lot).
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Pugh claims that the two rapes of which he was convicted constitute a single transaction under the continuing crime doctrine such that one conviction should be vacated. …
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The continuous crime doctrine applies only where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same “continuous” offense. Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1220 (Ind. 2015). The continuity of these men’s actions (i.e., raping the daughter in succession) does not negate the fact that these acts were completely separate offenses committed at separate times, some in a separate place (couch/floor), and each time by a different perpetrator. Following the logic of Firestone, these men clearly committed distinct, chargeable crimes at different times. Therefore, the rape in the bathroom and each rape in the den was separate in time from the other, and the continuing crime doctrine does not apply to Pugh’s rape convictions.
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For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting evidence obtained as a result of the seizure of Pugh and that there was sufficient evidence to support Pugh’s convictions of rape, attempted criminal deviate conduct, and carjacking as an accomplice. In addition, the single larceny rule is not violated by Pugh’s three robbery convictions, and the continuing crime doctrine does not apply to his convictions of two counts of rape. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Pugh’s motion for a mistrial.
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.