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Published by the Indiana Office of Court Services

Taylor-Bey v. State, No. 49A05-1503-CR-123, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App, April 28, 2016).

May 2, 2016 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: Appeals, N. Vaidik

Vaidik, C.J.
Case Summary
Tyreese Taylor-Bey was convicted of murder. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction based on his status as a “Moorish American National Sovereign” and “Secured Party Creditor.” Because the trial court had jurisdiction, we affirm.
…
Taylor-Bey also argues that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he is not a United States citizen but rather a Moorish American National. Taylor-Bey relies on Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856), for this proposition. However, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The Fourteenth Amendment overturned the Dred Scott decision and made “all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873).
In any event, personal jurisdiction does not require the defendant to be a United States citizen. See United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Personal jurisdiction is supplied by the fact that Burke is within the territory of the United States. Whether he came to this nation in a regular manner does not affect the court’s authority to resolve the criminal charges against him.”). Because Taylor-Bey’s crime occurred in Marion County, Indiana, Marion Superior Court had personal jurisdiction over him in this case. See Ind. Code § 35-41-1-1(b) (providing that a “person” may be convicted under Indiana law if the conduct or result occurred in Indiana); Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1 (“Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed . . . .”). We therefore affirm the trial court. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
 

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