Vaidik, C.J.
Case Summary
In this medical-malpractice case, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the evidence claiming that Dr. Arthur Alunday, M.D., made a judicial admission during his testimony that he breached the standard of care, thereby leaving only the issues of causation and damages for the jury. Although the trial court found that Dr. Alunday judicially admitted that he breached the standard of care, the court concluded that the judicial admission was not conclusive and binding but rather should be considered and weighed as other evidence. We clarify that, contrary to a line of authority that has developed in this Court, judicial admissions—as opposed to evidentiary admissions, which can be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact—are conclusive and binding on the trier of fact. Nevertheless, considering Dr. Alunday’s trial testimony as a whole, we find that he did not unequivocally admit that he breached the standard of care. We affirm the jury’s verdict in his favor.
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The distinction between judicial and evidentiary admissions is “significant” and “should not be blurred by imprecise usage.” Id.; see also 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 785 (2d ed. 2008). This is because, although both types are admissible, each type’s “legal effect is markedly different.” 32 C.J.S., supra, §624. While evidentiary admissions can be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact, judicial admissions are conclusive and binding on the trier of fact. Id.; 9 Wigmore, supra, § 2588 (explaining that judicial admissions, which are conclusive, are “sharply marked off” from evidentiary admissions, which are not conclusive). In fact, it is “universally conceded” that the “vital feature of a judicial admission is . . . its conclusiveness upon the party making it, i.e., the prohibition of any further dispute of the fact by him and of any use of evidence to disprove or contradict it.” 9 Wigmore, supra, § 2590. Simply put, a judicial admission is “a substitute for evidence, in that it does away with the need for evidence.” 9 Wigmore, supra, § 2588; see also Lutz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 848 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind. 2006) (noting that judicial admissions may be “taken as true as against the party without further controversy or proof” and are “conclusive as to that party”); 29A Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 783 (noting that judicial admissions are used as a substitute for evidence at trial); 6 Terrance L. Smith & Adrian P. Smith, Indiana Practice, Trial Handbook for Indiana Lawyers § 32:18 (2015 ed.) (“Admissions made in the course of judicial proceedings are substituted for actual proof of a fact.”).
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Because of an error made in 1990 in Waugh that commingled the standards for judicial and evidentiary admissions, which has since been repeated in other cases including Weinberger, we now clarify that unlike evidentiary admissions, which the trier of fact may accept or reject, judicial admissions are conclusive and binding on the trier of fact.
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…Accordingly, based on Dr. Alunday’s testimony as a whole, he did not unequivocally admit that he failed to consider whether MRSA could have spread to Hatton’s compression fracture. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Stewart’s motion for judgment on the evidence. [Footnote omitted]
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.