Dickson, J.
We uphold Indianapolis’ non-smoking ordinance (“Ordinance”), finding that it does not violate the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. While the Ordinance provides an exemption to satellite gambling facilities but not to bars and restaurants, Article 1, Section 23 does not prohibit this disparate treatment. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city.
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… We conclude that the first prong of Collins is satisfied because the disparate application of the Ordinance constitutes treatment that is reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that differentiate bars and restaurants from state-licensed satellite gambling facilities.
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… We clarify today that inherent distinguishing characteristics and how they are reasonably related to disparate treatment do not have to be specifically stated or explained in an ordinance. As Collins noted, it is enough that “[t]he legislative classification may have been based upon various features reasonably distinguishing Indiana agricultural employers from other employers . . . .” 644 N.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). Disparate treatment may be related to structural differences embodied in an ordinance or statute which create inherent distinguishing characteristics that are reasonably related to the disparate treatment.
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… These regulations apply to Hoosier Park, but not to bars and restaurants. Under this analysis, the classes are not “similarly situated,” and the second prong is not violated. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80.
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Conclusion
The challenged Ordinance does not violate the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Ordinance’s exemption for satellite gambling facilities is reasonably related to the inherent differences distinguishing satellite gambling facilities from bars and restaurants. The Ordinance also does not create a monopoly or treat similarly situated classes disparately in violation of Article 1 Section 23. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.