David, J.
Cathy Beloat, a citizen of Beech Grove, Indiana, fell and injured herself when she stepped into a hole on one of the Beech Grove City streets. She subsequently brought a claim against the City for her injuries. The City claimed it was immune from any liability under the discretionary function immunity provision within the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), among other things. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment. We now affirm that denial. To prevail on a claim that the City was entitled to discretionary function immunity under the ITCA, the City had the burden of showing that its omission was an official “policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and benefits.” Peavler v. Board of Com’rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind. 1988). The designated evidence failed to demonstrate that the City engaged in a policy decision to implement a total reconstruction project over carrying out individual repairs of road damage in the relevant area. Moreover, on summary judgment, “[a]ll facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources, 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001). As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
….
In the present case, the City has designated: (1) The Mayor’s affidavit, and (2) Minutes from the City Council and the Board of Works and Safety meetings. Beloat did not object to the admission of the Mayor’s affidavit at the summary judgment hearing. Thus, we first address the Mayor’s affidavit. Specifically, to what degree can the Mayor’s affidavit be relied upon to determine whether the failure to conduct routine maintenance on Main Street was postponed due to a policy determination to carry out complete reconstruction of Main Street.
….
…“Discretionary immunity . . . was not intended to protect a policy decision made by one Board member.” Scott, 659 N.E.2d at 591. Thus, the Mayor’s affidavit cannot be solely relied upon to demonstrate that the City engaged in a policy determination in this case. Because “[p]ublic policy decisions committed to a board or commission and entitled to discretionary immunity must be made in public in the manner provided by law, not on an informal basis outside of the public record,” we must look to the designated minutes of the City Council and Board of Works and Safety to determine whether a policy-oriented decision making process occurred. [Footnote omitted.] Id.
…Because the Mayor’s affidavit alone cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that an official policy decision was made, we now look to the designated minutes from the City Council and Board of Works and Safety meetings.
As for the remaining designated evidence of official conduct, the City Council meeting minutes seem to almost exclusively discuss the financial aspect of the Main Street Project…
….
…However, a governmental entity must demonstrate that “conscious balancing” took place, which can be shown by evidence that “the governmental entity considered improvements of the general type alleged in [the plaintiff’s] complaint.” Id. While the City did not need to demonstrate that it considered whether it should fill the specific hole that was alleged to have caused Beloat’s injuries, it did have to make some showing that the Main Street Project was implemented instead of general road repairs, such as filling pot holes, and that the costs and benefits of this decision were weighed. That is simply not present within this record.
While the facts presented in this case may have made the decision on immunity a close call, in those circumstances, we err on the side of narrowly construing a finding of immunity. Because the designated evidence of official action does not demonstrate the prioritization or cost benefit analysis that went into the development and approval of the Main Street Project, the City is not entitled to discretionary function immunity under the ITCA on summary judgment. Although it may be true that the City was within the planning phase of its reconstruction project when the incident occurred, we cannot reach that conclusion without drawing an inference against the non-movant. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. On remand, the City “bear[s] the burden [of] demonstrat[ing] the discretionary nature of the decision in order to prevail on a claim of immunity.” Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 48.
Conclusion
Based upon our review of the designated evidence and our existing precedent, the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and benefits. Thus, the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the question of discretionary function immunity under the ITCA. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, and Massa, J.J., concur.