Barnes, J.
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Villaruel’s jury trial was held on April 27, 2015. During jury selection, the State moved to strike for cause the only Hispanic venireperson, Ms. V., from the panel. The State ultimately used a peremptory strike on Ms. V., and Villaruel objected citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The trial court allowed the strike after stating, “There is no Batson issue for Hispanics.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] … Villaruel now appeals.
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Villaruel’s jury trial was held on April 27, 2015. During jury selection, the State moved to strike for cause the only Hispanic venireperson, Ms. V., from the panel. The State ultimately used a peremptory strike on Ms. V., and Villaruel objected citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The trial court allowed the strike after stating, “There is no Batson issue for Hispanics.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] … Villaruel now appeals.
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We observe that “[s]ince the Batson decision prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges, the United States Supreme Court has added challenges based upon ethnicity . . . . In Hernandez [v. New York], the challenge was made to Latino jurors, and the Supreme Court analyzed the discriminatory aspects of the case in terms of a race-based challenge.” Pryor v. Hoskins, 774 N.E.2d 943, 954 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)). [Footnote omitted.]
This case is similar to Ashabraner v. Bowers, 753 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. 2001), in which our supreme court reversed a jury verdict on Batson grounds. In that case, the plaintiff made a Batson objection, but the trial court failed to analyze that objection as required by Batson. See id. at 665-66. … On appeal, this Court conducted its own Batson analysis without relying on the trial court’s misunderstanding of the law. See id. We concluded the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination and affirmed the trial court. See id. Our supreme court held that that conclusion, which we reached after an incomplete Batson analysis, was error:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of whether [the defendant] could offer a race neutral explanation. Because the trial court applied the wrong standard and the Court of Appeals held that [the plaintiff] had not made out a prima facie case, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Id. at 667-68.
The colloquy related to Villaruel’s Batson objection “demonstrates that the trial court did not adhere fully to the principles enunciated in Batson and subsequent cases.” Id. at 666. Like the trial court in Ashabraner, the trial court did not analyze Villaruel’s objection to the peremptory challenge and did not follow Batson, even though it applies to challenges based on ethnicity. See id. at 666.
We acknowledge that Ashabraner is a civil case and this is a criminal case. However, Batson applies equally to criminal [footnote omitted] and civil cases, and this case cannot be distinguished from Ashabraner on that ground. [Citation omitted.] Therefore, Ashabraner’s mandate that the trial court, and not an appellate court, must conduct a complete Batson analysis when a litigant objects to a peremptory strike on Batson grounds, applies squarely in this criminal case. Likewise, it is clear the Batson analysis must be conducted when a litigant challenges a peremptory strike of a Hispanic juror. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 395. The trial court did not perform the requisite Batson analysis related to the State’s use of a peremptory strike of Ms. V., a Hispanic juror, and we may not conduct the analysis ourselves. Instead, we reverse Villaruel’s convictions.
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The trial court erred by not undertaking the required Batson analysis. Double jeopardy does not bar the State from retrying Villaruel. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.