Crone, J.
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In spring 2014, the Shelbyville Central School Corporation (the “School Corporation”) terminated the employment of Jennifer Frink … , a secretary at Shelbyville High School, … [and] instructed the Shelbyville Police Department to issue a criminal trespass warning to Frink advising her that she was prohibited from coming onto all School Corporation property. In fall 2014, Frink entered onto the property of Coulston Elementary School, part of the School Corporation, and the State subsequently charged her with level 6 felony criminal trespass.
Frink filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35- 34-1-4(a)(5). Specifically, Frink alleged that she cannot be guilty of criminal trespass because she had a contractual interest in School Corporation property by virtue of her status as a parent of children living within the school system. … Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. … Finding that the State alleged sufficient facts to disprove that Frink had a contractual interest in School Corporation property … , we affirm.
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Frink claims that … she had a contractual interest in [the Elementary School] property “arising out of her status as a legal custodial parent of two children living in the Shelbyville School system” for whom “the Indiana Constitution guarantees a public education.” [Footnote omitted.] [Record citation omitted.] We must disagree.
Noting that the phrase “contractual interest in the property” is not defined by the criminal trespass statute or elsewhere in the Indiana Code, our supreme court has determined that “a contractual interest in the property” should be very narrowly defined as “a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n.2 (Ind. 2012). The lack of a contractual interest in the real property at issue is a material element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 143 n.3. While the State here need only to have alleged facts constituting an offense in order to survive a motion to dismiss, we note that in order to prove the offense of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt, “the State need not ‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather, the State “satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Id.
The facts presented by the State and taken as true indicate that Frink is a former employee of the School Corporation who knowingly or intentionally entered the real property of the School Corporation after having been specifically and repeatedly denied entry by an authorized agent of the School Corporation. The facts as alleged disprove that Frink had any right, title, or legal share of the Coulston Elementary School property arising out of a binding agreement between Frink and the School Corporation, and the lack of such contractual interest is reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.
Frink’s assertion that her mere status as a parent of children within the School Corporation conferred upon her a contractual interest in the Coulston Elementary School property is made without citation to relevant authority and is unpersuasive. Indeed, Lyles instructs us to not think so broadly regarding what constitutes a contractual interest in real property. …
In advocating for dismissal of the charge against her, Frink essentially asks that we declare, as a matter of law, that a parent of a student can never be charged with criminal trespass when the real property involved happens to be the student’s school because the status of being a parent of a child living within the school district confers a contractual interest in school property that the State cannot disprove. Neither our legislature nor our judiciary has limited the application of our criminal trespass statute in such a way, and we will not do so here. The State has alleged sufficient facts to disprove that Frink had a contractual interest in the Coulston Elementary School property.
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… Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frink’s motion to dismiss the criminal trespass charge. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J. concur.