Massa, J.
Indiana Code section 3-11-1.5-3.4 created a Small Precinct Committee in Lake County and directed it to identify precincts with fewer than 500 active voters that may be amenable to consolidation, a measure intended to reduce election costs in a county that is home to over 15% of our state’s small precincts. Implementing such a consolidation plan, however, could jeopardize the offices of some precinct committeepersons, who brought suit challenging the Statute. We are asked to decide whether this piece of legislation is contrary to our Indiana Constitution. Finding it is neither an impermissible special law nor a violation of our separation of powers doctrine, we determine the Statute is constitutionally sound, and accordingly, we reverse the trial court.
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Conclusion Because Lake County’s proportion and number of small precincts is sufficiently exceptional to justify the special application of the Statute, and because the precinct committeepersons are not state officers within the ambit of our separation of powers doctrine, we see no constitutional defect. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson and David, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Rucker, J., dissenting.
This Court has long adhered to the rule that “for a special law to be imposed, it must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics of the territory in which it is applied, and apply equally to those who share those characteristics.” Mun. City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. 2003); accord Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 78-79 (Ind. 1994). But the Court’s opinion today departs from this long-standing requirement instead for an analysis that permits special legislation upon a finding of “unique circumstances” as proffered by the State in defending the challenged legislation. Applying precedent, as we should, I do not believe speculations on what the legislature could have found should substitute for actual findings, reflecting inherent characteristics of the affected class. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the statute at issue is constitutionally permissible.